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ABSTRACT 
Military change has been a persistent characteristic of Japan’s re-emergence from 
World War II.  However, most studies focus on Tokyo’s “evolutionary-like” and 
“incremental” efforts, rooting them in a host of structural impediments to change.  
Nonetheless, Japan continues to strengthen its reliance on the U.S. “sword” while 
building a broader more effective “shield.”  Through three case studies (U.S alignment in 
the 1950s/1960s, the 1981 expansion to a 1,000nm defense perimeter, and post–Cold War 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with the United States) this thesis shows that 
despite pervasive pacifism, deeply riven domestic politics, and apparent inflexibility on 
military security policy, Japan has nonetheless been capable of initiating significant 
military change.   
While international systemic factors and U.S. pressure have played a role, Japan’s 
security policies have formed under the political, institutional, legal, and societal norms 
infused in the postwar environment.  This has required political elites to subordinate 
national security interests to the influence of Japan’s evolving domestic political 
environment.  Ultimately, these barriers have diminished as Japan’s domestic political 
environment has consolidated, resulting in an ability to quicker react to external events.  
This thesis suggests that U.S. policy toward Japan, while important, overlooks the core 
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Over the last 150 years, Japan has undergone more military change than most 
nations.  Today, it faces a demanding security environment that will require even more 
change.  This thesis will explore three case studies during and after the Cold War where 
Japanese military security policies and defense structures have shifted in response to a 
variety of internal and external factors.  By understanding what has prompted Japan to 
pursue military change in the past, we can be better prepared to anticipate the future.   
B. IN SEARCH OF A SECURITY IDENTITY 
In the mid-nineteenth century, following more than two hundred years of self-
imposed isolation, Japan embarked upon a nation building effort that, within less than 
one generation, had replaced the conservative Tokugawa regime with one on an almost 
equal status with the West.  In this environment of growing Western-imposed colonialism 
and treaty port systems, Japanese elites reached out to the West and launched an 
ambitious plan to centralize politics, modernize the economy, and organize a standing 
military.  Japan’s geopolitical environment—an insular island nation whose sense of 
vulnerability has been exacerbated by a relative lack of natural resources—while largely 
unchanged from past centuries, became increasingly more important as the great powers 
dominated the surrounding regions.  The formation of an industrialized nation-state 
brought mixed blessings.  On the one hand, it provided the financial and technological 
capability to successfully compete in the international system, while on the other it also 
further exposed and compounded Japan’s feeling of vulnerability.   
In search of security in this international context, Japan continued its skillful 
emulation of the Western powers and began colonizing neighboring regions like Taiwan, 
Korea, and Manchuria.  After the start of the Pacific War, this influence would extend 
across the Asia-Pacific region and into Southeast Asia.  This era of Japanese dominance 
provided a number of key influences that would accelerate the eventual decolonization 
that would take place following World War II.  Defeat in World War II brought not only 
horrendous physical destruction, but also complete moral and psychological humiliation.  
The U.S. occupation began the process of demilitarization, decentralization, and 
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democratization (Three Ds).  Accordingly, Japan de-armed and relinquished all its 
acquired territories.  Nationalistic tendencies within these regions, which had slowly 
developed over prior decades, accelerated as the Japanese surrendered and headed home.  
The 1947 Constitution and the U.N. Charter set the initial agenda by precluding a 
significant role for Japan in both East Asian and global security.1  This tendency was 
assisted externally by the engendered fear of Japanese militarism in East Asia.  
Moreover, internally the emergent norm of anti-militarism fostered almost complete 
public distrust of Tokyo’s policy-making process.  As the ensuing Cold War in Europe 
spread to Asia, the struggle between the two superpowers introduced a global 
bipolarization that competed not only ideologically but also politically and economically.  
Nonetheless, the security environment and its underlying geopolitics were still relatively 
the same in Japan.  Insularity and the sense of vulnerability remained, continuing the 
need for Tokyo to be sensitive to the shifting balance of power between the great 
maritime powers as well as neighboring continental powers of the region.   
In response to these trends, Washington executed a “course reversal” in the late 
1940s as the Three Ds gave way to the Five Rs (reconstructing the economy, restraining 
labor, rehabilitating individuals, rearming the military, and realigning Japan with the 
West).2  The necessity of these efforts was reinforced with the 1949 Communist victory 
in China, the onset of the Korean War in 1950, and the subsequent 1954–55 Taiwan 
Straits crisis.  In this dynamic environment, Tokyo faced a variety of foreign policy 
options to address its security needs and interests.  These included alliance, autonomy, 
Asian identification, and multilateralism via the United Nations.3  Faced with increasing 
U.S. pressure, conservative Japanese elites accepted America’s security umbrella in 
exchange for the return of sovereignty in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and 
subsequent bilateral alliance.  
Under the stewardship of Prime Minister Yoshida and the “1955 system,” the 
LDP ensured political stability through the formula of U.S. alignment and economic                                                  
1  Glenn D. Hook and others, Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, 2nd 
ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 250. 
2  James L. McClain, Japan, a Modern History (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002), 92. 
3  Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain 
Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 22. 
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growth.4  This strategy, however, was not without risk.  As the weaker member of this 
alliance, Japan faced the dilemma of entrapment versus abandonment where too much 
dependence could lead to unwanted involvement in outside affairs or too little might 
result in little or no support in a time of need.  More importantly, U.S. bilateralism 
provided both military and economic “breathing room” and ultimately subordinated 
Tokyo’s security contribution to an indirect role tied primarily to the actions of 
Washington.  
In this indirect role, Tokyo’s security relationship with its Asian neighbors has 
become known as comprehensive security.  This multilevel and multidimensional 
concept of security has been used to supplement U.S. bilateralism in a search for 
alternative, nonmilitary means to guarantee security. 5  Officially introduced in the early 
1980s during the Ohira administration, comprehensive security had evolved over the 
early postwar decades in response to internal LDP politics, opposition party influence, 
changing international conditions, outside U.S. pressure, and public opinion.6  Armed 
with only a quasi-legitimate military and faced with anti-militarism at home mixed with 
lingering animosity of its neighbors, Japan was forced to find other avenues (e.g., 
economic, diplomatic, social, etc) to enhance regional political stability and ultimately its 
own overall security.  Anchored to bilateralism with the United States still today, Japan 
has nonetheless sought a security identity of its own and military change has been an 
integral part of that search. 
C. MILITARY CHANGE AND THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE  
Since the end of World War II, the economic and political dynamism of the Asia-
Pacific region has been underpinned by an informal security system comprised 
principally of a U.S. forward deployed presence and a network of bilateral alliances.  
Here, the U.S.-Japan alliance has served to defend Japan and protect its interests in Asia 
while serving as the foundation of the U.S. presence and influence in the region.  The 
alliance has also provided the framework within which the Japanese military has been 
                                                 
4  Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, 36. 
5  Hook and others, Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, 251. 
6  Joseph P. Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures 
(Armonk, NY; London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 81. 
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rebuilt.  The original security treaty, signed in 1951 and revised in 1960, solidified 
Japan’s strategic dependence on the United States and guaranteed its economic 
interdependence with the West.  However, despite Japan’s successful economic recovery 
during the Cold War and the ongoing changes in the international system in the post-Cold 
War environment, the credibility of this military alliance has been heavily scrutinized and 
routinely questioned.  Tokyo’s efforts to deliver real military interoperability and 
readiness between U.S. and Japanese forces have been marginalized by at best slow, 
evolutionary-like incrementalism and at worst almost complete immobility. 
1. Japanese Defense Weaknesses 
During the Cold War, Japan built the world’s second largest economy, and under 
the U.S. security umbrella, it also constructed the concomitant financial and technological 
ability to once again transform itself into a formidable military power.  Today, Japan 
possesses an impressive standing military.  However, military cooperation between 
American and Japanese forces has been a relatively new aspect within the framework of 
the alliance.  Due to a variety of factors, Japan’s technologically advanced Self-Defense 
Force (JSDF) has lacked key equipment, training, and doctrine to conduct interoperable 
joint and combined operations.  Additionally, the defense-only nature of the JSDF 
mission has also produced a defense community that exhibits specific inherent 
weaknesses.   
From the Meiji restoration to its postwar economic renaissance, Japan has shown 
great prowess at studying, adapting, and improving upon the behaviors of others.  Japan’s 
SDF is situated in a region with no collective security structures, multilateral institutions, 
or even firm alliances outside the U.S. network of bilateral alliances.  Combined with an 
ambiguous defensive role and conservative domestic politics, these factors have created 
unique modernization challenges for Japanese military leaders and civilian policymakers.  
The current process responsible for shaping military transformation has fostered slow 
incremental changes that are far more evolutionary than innovative. 
In addition, as will demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the defense-only nature 
of the JSDF mission and its surrounding defense community exhibits four inherent 
weaknesses.  First, its authority and operational effectiveness in conducting military 
operations has been undermined by its quasi-legitimate foundation stemming from 
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Article 9 of its postwar constitution and exacerbated by limited support from a pacifist, 
civilian population.  Second, extreme civilian control, coupled with strong bureaucratic 
influence and close ties to the business/defense industrial base, has complicated the 
development of security policy.  Third, the defense industry has delivered weak domestic 
defense production capabilities enhanced by low R&D funding, small domestic 
equipment orders, and legislative export prohibitions.  This has led to an inability to 
operate, design, develop, and produce advanced, cost-effective military systems that meet 
the standards of worldwide competition.  Finally, all these factors have resulted in a 
military characterized by an unbalanced force structure that is deficient in several critical 
operational and support areas and whose defense budget, in comparison to its overall 
population and economic strength, is relatively modest. 
2. Japanese Defense Strengths 
Nonetheless, over the last fifty years the Japanese government has demonstrated a 
steady commitment to increasing both the quantitative and qualitative strength of it 
defense forces.  From this foundation, the JSDF has grown into the most technologically 
advanced military in the region (behind the United States) with military forces 
comparable in manpower and firepower to those of the United Kingdom.  In 2003, this 
capability provided approximately 240,000 personnel, 700 main battle tanks, 510 aircraft, 
and 160 surface ships and submarines funded by the fourth largest defense budget 
(US$45 billion) behind the United States, Russia, and China.7   
Over the decades, Japan has expanded both the functional and geographic reach 
of its defensive “shield” and facilitated increased U.S. defense cooperation in the form of 
interoperability and military readiness.  This steady expansion has occurred in the face of 
tumultuous international conditions where relative U.S. power and commitment to the 
region has often declined and been called into question.  Despite numerous opportunities 
to react to this shifting power balance, Japan has stayed the course and reaffirmed its 
commitment to the alliance in every decade.   
 
 
                                                 
7  Hook and others, Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, 13. 
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D. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to identify the underlying mechanisms that 
have driven Japanese military change.  Ultimately, it will show that despite pervasive 
pacifism, deeply rived domestic politics, and apparent inflexibility on military security 
policy, Japan has nonetheless been capable of initiating military change that has 
enhanced interoperability and military readiness between U.S. and Japanese forces.  In 
doing so, it will also provide deeper insights into the general processes of military change 
and innovation.  Three case studies will be presented to illustrate how the U.S.-Japan 
alliance has served as a catalyst to promote military change.  The first two case studies 
occurred during the Cold War and promoted first the buildup of modern equipment and 
then an expansion of the roles and missions of the SDF in regional security.  The third 
case transitions to the post-Cold war period allowing greater military normalization effort 
and the potential for the SDF actually participating in collective defense.  Throughout this 
fifty-year period, Japan has continued to strengthen its reliance on the U.S. “sword” while 
building a broader more effective “shield.”   
The material will be presented in the following manner.  Chapter II will review 
the literature surrounding military change and innovation and define relevant 
terminology.  Chapter III will provide an overview of Japan’s defense structure and 
highlight the inherent structural impediments to change that have been infused in the 
postwar environment.  Chapter IV will introduce the first of three case studies and will 
present Japan’s decision to accept U.S. alignment in the 1950s, and its subsequent actions 
to codify this action in defense policy and rearm over four defense plans through the mid-
1970s despite internal and external pressures.  Chapter V includes the second case study 
and will review Japan’s decision in the 1980s to expand their defensive perimeter from 
12 nautical miles to 1,000 nautical miles surrounding the sea lines of communication, 
thus establishing a strategic imperative behind the 1978 Guidelines of Defense 
Cooperation.   Chapter VI will address the third case study and will investigate Japan’s 
decision to pursue ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with the United States in 
the 1990s with the potential to finally bring collective defense into the U.S.-Japan 
alliance.  Finally, Chapter VII will provide concluding observations and estimates of the 
prospects for progress. 
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II. THEORIES OF INNOVATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
How does one explain the continuity of consistent growth in JSDF capabilities 
and increasing defense cooperation with the United States despite repeated shifts in both 
prevailing domestic and international conditions over the past fifty years?  Looking at 
Japan, the institutional norms created by its Confucian cultural heritage have been 
credited with producing a society “which has shown its superiority in innovative 
incremental improvement of imported technology.” 8   Combined with a long-term 
perspective, innate respect for hierarchical authority, and the need to consult multiple 
interest groups, consensus building has been viewed as slow and cautious, but once a 
decision has been made the implementation proceeds rapidly due to the high level of 
commitment.  The Japanese military security policy process has exhibited many of these 
characteristics, but there are other factors that need to be addressed to explain the 
steadfast continuity in strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance started in 1951.  
In a general sense then, why and how do militaries change?  This question has 
received increasing scholarly attention over the past few decades.  Social and political 
scientists, military historians, and analysts have added to a growing body of literature that 
focuses on the dynamics driving such military change and its subsequent success or 
failure.  Stephen Rosen describes the problems of military innovation as necessarily 
problems of bureaucratic innovation, which by their very nature are not supposed to 
innovate. 9   Yet, through a variety of factors utilizing emulation, adaptation, and/or 
innovation, military organizations can and do successfully change.  This chapter 
introduces the background and terminology relevant to this study and reviews the current 
literature on military change and innovation. 
B. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY 
Military organizations are faced with the constant challenge of adapting to the 
ever-changing strategic, political, budgetary, and technological environments of modern 
                                                 
8  Ronald Philip Dore, Taking Japan Seriously:  A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic Issues 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 142. 
9  Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 2. 
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nation-states and the realities of the international system.  They are also the product of an 
ongoing institutionalization process that is the result of complex internal competition and 
norms.  From a state-centric perspective, military change can be viewed as a rational state 
response to changing strategic circumstances where the need to survive forces states to 
organize war as efficiently as possible due primarily to changing threats and balance of 
power.10   In contrast to this unitary actor level of analysis, military organizations can 
also be perceived as organizations subject to particular sociological processes.  At this 
level, the ability to innovate may be influenced by forces that lead organizations to 
become more similar to one another.11  Each of these perspectives provides different 
insights into the internal and external factors affecting military organizational change.   
In discussing innovation and evolving military capabilities, several terms are 
prevalent in the literature and receive varying treatment by military officials, analysts, 
and other observers.  First, in the broadest sense, military “modernization” involves the 
complex process of manipulating three primary components encompassing equipment, 
doctrine, and organization.  Military managers are charged with monitoring current and 
future trends in order to procure new technologies and equipment, shape doctrine, and 
modify organizational structures.  Thus, military modernization involves the ongoing 
commitment to improvement and can be defined as the relevant upgrade of existing 
military capabilities through the acquisition of new imported or indigenously developed 
weapons systems and supporting assets, the incorporation of new doctrines, the creation 
of new organizational structures, and the institutionalization of new manpower 
management and combat training regimes.12   
Next, the term defense “transformation” has been increasingly used since the late 
1990s to describe U.S. efforts to make its forces more mobile, agile, and lethal through 
greater reliance on capabilities involving network-centric warfare concepts and C4ISR 
(command, control, communication, computer, information, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance) technologies.  In general, transformation can be thought of as large-scale,                                                  
10  Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, The Sources of Military Change:  Culture, Politics, Technology 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 16. 
11  Ibid., 92. 
12  Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era 
of Uncertainty (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 15. 
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discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts of 
operations, and organization that are prompted by significant changes in technology or 
the emergence of new and different international security challenges.  Transformation, in 
this context, is commonly perceived as a continuing process that does not have a defined 
end state.  It anticipates and creates the future and deals with the co-evolution of concepts, 
processes, organizations, and technology.  Ultimately, transformation creates new 
competitive areas and competencies and identifies, leverages, or creates new underlying 
principles for the way things are done.13   
Third, the concept of “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) has also been used to 
describe major changes in the character of warfare.  RMAs have occurred throughout 
history and involve a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations 
which either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a dominant 
player, or creates one or more new core competencies, in some new dimension of 
warfare, or both.14  While RMA and transformation are used interchangeably in some of 
the literature, transformation centers on the process of changing existing structures in 
reaction to or anticipation of an RMA.   
“Interoperability” is the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to 
and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so 
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
interoperability is primarily used in reference to the ability of American and Japanese 
forces to more effectively and efficiently operate together by being capable of 
communicating (e.g., voice, data, signal intelligence, etc) with each other.  Traditionally, 
this has equated to having the JSDF buy or build systems under U.S. licensing.  Having 
the same equipment has also carried the additional advantage of increasing operational 
effectiveness because both sides have the same basic capabilities and missions and have a 
better understanding of how to integrate these capabilities. 
                                                 
13  U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Force Transformation, 
Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Fall 2003, 8. 
14  Richard O. Hundley, Chapter Two: “Characteristics of Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Past 
Revolutions, Future Transformations (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999), 9. 
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In studying and categorizing military change, scholars have focused on doctrinal 
change, organization goals, and the development of new combat arms as primary 
outcomes identifying major “military change.”  Theo Farrell captured these in his 
definition of military change as a “change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structures 
of a military organization.”15  The interwar period highlights many of these types of 
changes.  For example, the U.S. Marine Corps shifted their goals during this period from 
light infantry to an amphibious warfare role.  Second, a major strategy change occurred 
as the U.S. Navy shifted from a battleship-based naval strategy to one centered on aircraft 
carriers.  Furthermore, aircraft carrier operations also led to significant organizational 
restructuring as the Navy moved away from battlefleets and fielded carrier task forces.  In 
the context of this definition, other changes like operational tactics and associated 
technologies are relegated to the “minor” category and are not included, not because they 
are unimportant, but because they require a lesser degree of resource commitment.  
Ultimately, these minor changes do not involve the adoption of new military goals, 
strategies, or structures, and therefore have lesser implications for international 
security.16 
Finally, since much of the innovation literature focuses on major military change, 
these two terms are often used interchangeably.  However, “innovation” is just one of 
three pathways whereby military change occurs—the other two being adaptation and 
emulation.17  Specifically, innovation involves the development of new technologies, 
tactics, strategies, and structures.  In contrast, “adaptation” involves simply adjusting 
existing means and methods, and can often lead to innovation over time if and when 
multiple adjustments lead to new applications.  Lastly, “emulation” imports new tools 
and ways of war through imitation of other organizations.  Thus, major military change 
occurs as the product or outcome of innovation, adaptation, and/or emulation that leads to 
new military means and methods resulting in new organizational goals, strategies, and 
structures.   
 
                                                 
15  Farrell and Terriff, The Sources of Military Change:  Culture, Politics, Technology, 5. 
16  Ibid., 6. 
17  Ibid. 
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C.  MILITARY CHANGE AND INNOVATION 
Military change, like other forms of change (e.g., political, social, economic, etc), 
requires the application of initiative and a cognitive assumption of risk.  Addressing 
social innovation almost five hundred years ago, Machiavelli noted that “there is nothing 
more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, 
than to initiate a new order of things.”18  Military bureaucracies, steeped in tradition and 
focused on discipline, represent the ultimate in large, monolithic government 
bureaucracies.  Designed for routine, repetitive, and orderly action, they naturally prefer 
continuity over change.19  Militaries are particularly sensitive to change since not only 
does it threaten the organization, but also involves putting soldiers’ very lives at risk.   
Current innovation literature contains a wide array of examples of this type of resistance 
to change.  Like the persistence of horse cavalry and the painful birth of battlefield 
mechanization in the interwar period, military institutions have repeatedly demonstrated 
their traditional and conservative nature by preserving known strategies and structures 
rather than adopting new ones. 20   However, bureaucracies, even military ones, do 
innovate, and social scientists have attempted to explain why and under what conditions 
it occurs.   
Unfortunately the results of more than a half of century of analysis are not 
promising.  Much of this literature has focused on case-studies highlighting failures to 
innovate.  One study found that out of thirty-eight different propositions on innovation, 
academics disagreed about thirty-four of these and that the remaining four had yet to be 
fully discussed by experts.21  Rosen states:  
No good explanation of bureaucratic innovation exists.  There are only 
contradictory results from different studies…Summing up the state of 
knowledge in the field of bureaucratic innovation, two scholars found that 
factors found to be important for innovation in one study are found to be                                                  
18 As quoted from The Prince in Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, 
1. 
19  Farrell and Terriff, The Sources of Military Change:  Culture, Politics, Technology, 4. 
20 See Edward L. Katzenbach Jr., The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century as quoted in Farrell and 
Terriff, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, 4; and David E. Johnson, Fast 
Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998), 288. 
21  Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, 4. 
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considerable less important, not important at all, or even inversely 
important in another study…The authors advised others to set aside a 
search for grand theories of innovation…and recognize that different kinds 
of innovation occur for different reasons in the same organization, and that 
different organizations will handle innovation very differently.22   
With such large disparity and incongruity among scholars, where then does one 
look to identify the underlying causes for what drives militaries to undertake major 
change? Farrell and Terriff outlined three basic sources of military change—cultural 
norms, politics and strategy, and new technology. 23   Kier focused on the cultural 
perspective in her analysis of changing military doctrine in France during the interwar 
period arguing that neither civilians nor the military behaved as hypothesized by 
structural or functional analysis.  In her words, “restricting the sources of military 
doctrine to the calculations of balance of power politics inadequately depicts the 
influence of civilian policy makers and the external environment.”24  This culturalist 
approach differs from the rationalist tradition in which the international system provides 
accurate clues for civilian intervention in doctrinal developments to intervene and 
override the parochial interests of the military.25   
The political economy of technology encompasses a wide range of theories and 
focuses on the development of technology and its corresponding procurement and 
organizational structures, as well as social, political, economic, and legal norms within 
society.  Demchak highlights the inherent problems of integrating complex machinery 
into constrained military organizations.26  Military managers, aware of their operational 
unknowns, seek equipment, structures, and procedures that reduce uncertainty.  However, 
the level of complexity in new machines raises the uncertainty of operations for the entire 
organization thus introducing greater complexity into the overall organization.  
Skolnikoff traces the dynamic relationship between scientific/technological change and                                                  
22  Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, 4. 
23  Farrell and Terriff, The Sources of Military Change:  Culture, Politics, Technology, 6. 
24  Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II,” ch. 6 in Peter J. 
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), 186. 
25  Ibid., 188.  
26  Chris C. Demchak, Military Organizations, Complex Machines:  Modernization in the U.S. Armed 
Services (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 163. 
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international affairs.27  Whether it is nuclear weapons, the eradication of small pox, or 
instantaneous communications, science and technology have become arguably the most 
powerful and persistent factors leading to societal change.  The speed and nature of 
transformation is also dependent on the public and private support provided through 
government policies and societal frameworks.   
Finally, out of the various case studies and papers, three major theories of 
successful innovation have emerged.28   The first, associated with Rosen, posits that 
revolutionary innovation in the military takes place mostly from within its own ranks and 
that uniformed personnel are the ones primarily able to introduce effective change into 
the system.29  The second by Barry Posen, argues that major innovation in the military 
takes place mostly under the prodding of civilians, who are free from the emotional and 
psychological baggage that accompanies a lifetime of professional service in the 
military.30  Posen argues that military change requires both strategic imperative and 
civilian intervention.31   The third theory of innovation, by Owen Cote and Harvey 
Sapolsky, believes that inter-service competition serves as a catalyst of innovation as 
competing services fight for influence under the same limited defense budget.32  It is this 
competition that spurs each service to develop innovations to overtake the others.   
In specifically addressing Japanese conditions, Alagappa identifies the lopsided 
Japanese civil-military relations inherent in the postwar environment and the incremental 
normalization steps that have occurred in the past decade.33  Katzenstein provides a 
detailed account of the state structure and the social and legal normative context of this 
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International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 4. 
28  Choy Dawen, “Innovation in Military Organisations,” Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, vol. 
27, (Apr-Jun 2001). 
29  Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, 2. 
30  Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World 
Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 283. 
31  Farrell and Terriff, The Sources of Military Change:  Culture, Politics, Technology, 12. 
32  See Owen Reid Cote, Jr., “The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The United States Navy 
and Fleet Ballistic Missiles” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996); Harvey M. 
Sapolsky, "On the Theory of Military Innovation," Breakthroughs 9, no. 1 (2000). 
33  Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance:  The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 594. 
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period.34  Green traces the role of autonomous defense production in modernization 
efforts.35  And finally, Samuels highlights the defining role of technonationalism in the 
Japanese strategy of achieving national security through economic domination.36 
D. SUMMARY 
The terminology and theoretical approaches outlined above provide a starting 
point and a variety of frameworks from which to assess the primary factors affecting the 
nature and speed of military change in Japan during the first fifty years of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance.  Chapter Three will outline the structure of Japan’s defense community that has 
been created out of the postwar domestic and international environment.  These 
weaknesses/constraints are outlined in order to emphasize the relative significance of the 
changes in military goals, strategies, and/or structures which will be reviewed in each of 
the subsequent case studies.  The case studies will show that none of the theoretical 
frameworks have a high correlation to Japan’s self-defense oriented experience with 
military change during this period.  Ultimately, factors involving a combination of U.S. 
alliance pressure and civilian/bureaucratic control distracted by domestic politics must be 
considered in addition to external strategic concerns to explain the increasing rate of 
military change and the alliance’s transition from cooperation and regional security to the 
increasing potential of collective self-defense. 
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III. DOMESTIC STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO CHANGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As noted in the introduction, the postwar period in Japan heralded significant 
hurdles for Japanese policymakers and defense planners.  While Japan’s security 
remained closely tied to its external threats, the rules of the previous militaristic decades 
evaporated.  Japanese elites, however, still understood the importance of maintaining a 
military capability, and alignment with the United States provided stability in a politically 
unsettled environment.  While the LDP eventually established majority rule, the domestic 
political struggle both within factions of the LDP as well as outside opposition parties has 
continued to play a significant role in shaping the direction of defense planning.  Overall, 
this has led to tight civilian control, and in combination with incremental change, it has 
fostered a military lacking both concrete doctrine and the necessary training to perform 
both joint and combined operations.  Furthermore, inherent components of Japan’s 
political economy have produced structural constraints, which while enhancing 
commercial enterprises, have delivered less capable and less interoperable equipment.  
The natural bureaucratic tendency to resist change has been amplified by the interactions 
of these two factors.  This chapter surveys this range of constraints on Japanese ability to 
prudently make major military change. 
B. DEFENSE CONSTRAINTS AND CIVILIAN CONTROL 
Modern Japan has experienced the full spectrum of civil-military power 
balancing—from complete division of authority between the civil and military sectors 
prior to 1945 to extreme civilian domination in the postwar period.37  This resulted from 
both the U.S. occupation forces’ initial goal of demilitarization and domestic perceptions 
from the terrible memories of the war and the strong distrust of the military.38  Sixty 
years later, strong pacifism still resonates in Japanese society.  At the heart of this 
pacifism sits an often debated, but yet unchanged 9th article of the constitution.  It states: 
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Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.  The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.39 
The constitution also stipulates that the prime minister and other state ministers 
must be civilians.  Furthermore, the 1954 Defense Agency Law established the Japanese 
Defense Agency (JDA) as an external bureau of the prime minister’s office thus denying 
it ministerial authority and prestige.  The annual defense budget is prepared by the 
cabinet and determined by the National Diet.  Regarding the JSDF and the administration 
of national defense, the prime minister, on behalf of the cabinet, exercises supreme 
control and gives orders to the director-general of the JDA, who in turns gives orders to 
the chiefs of staffs of the three services.  While these restrictions and civilian-military 
relations may appear normal for any modern democracy, for Japan they represented just 
one or a multi-layered approach initiated specifically to limit military influence and 
remove it as far as possible from the policymaking process.  This process began under 
imposed guidance during the U.S. occupation and transitioned to domestic politics where 
it remains a powerful force even today. 
In addition to Article 9, other layers have included:  ban on sending military units 
into combat abroad (1954 Ban on Overseas Dispatch Law); denial of the right of 
collective self-defense (Constitutional interpretation); political constraints on defense 
spending (1976 One Percent of GNP Ceiling); ban on conscription; ban on the export of 
arms (1967 Three Principles on Arms Exports and 1976 cabinet decision to expand ban to 
all nations); the ban on dispatching minesweepers (1972 Sato administration); the three 
nuclear principles that prohibit the possessing, manufacturing, and introduction of nuclear 
weapons (1967 Diet Speech and 1971 Resolution); and the commitment to the peaceful 
use of space (1967 Diet Resolution).40  These political manipulations have been used by 
the ruling party as a method of managing incremental change to minimize conflict in 
response to competing international and domestic pressures over defense.  Specifically, 
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these policy constraints, in combination with incremental budgetary allocations, have 
limited the scope of Japan’s defense buildup allowing minimal changes to occur in force 
structure thus minimizing internal and external political conflict.41   
Therefore, the principle of civilian supremacy over the military has become 
embedded in the command structure for the operations of the JSDF.42  The organization 
of the Japanese state has made it virtually impossible, short of a domestic political 
revolution, for an autonomous and powerful military establishment to emerge in Japan, 
and the structure of state-society relations in Japan isolates the military from a public 
which at best can muster no more than passive tolerance for the armed forces.43   
Fundamentally, these constraints have limited the roles and capabilities of the 
JSDF.  However, more importantly, they have also undermined the authority of the forces 
to conduct effective military operations both at home and abroad.  Militarily, the alliance 
stands today as an untested entity.  Even as JSDF forces have deployed in support of 
various U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1992, the limited defensive role of their 
involvement has continued to impede their effectiveness in delicate international 
operations.  As recently as the current Iraq War, the strict rules of engagement, combined 
with pressure to avoid casualties, have in practice rendered JSDF troops unable to defend 
themselves while requiring Dutch, British, and Australian troops to protect them against 
insurgents.44  Additionally, limited joint training and poor interoperability within JSDF 
branches and between U.S. forces have further complicated Japan’s ability to assume 
larger military roles and responsibilities.  Indeed, Japan’s old imperial sword has been 
replaced by a new one that lacks the “well-honed edge of its predecessor and is a bit rusty 
from disuse.”45   
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C. DEFENSE INDUSTRY TIES AND JSDF CAPABILITIES 
Within Japan’s defense economy, unlike the civil-military realm, government-
business relations have been excellent.  Economic vulnerability, driven by reliance on 
import of raw materials, has equated to uncontested public and government support on 
issues of economic security and a commitment to technological autonomy.46  Despite its 
Peace Constitution and close security ties to the United States, Japan has designed and 
produced an impressive array of indigenous high-tech missiles, tanks, warships, and 
aircraft.  Japan’s worldwide leadership in technology innovation and quality 
improvement has been unparalleled.  Yet for all its impressive hardware, Japan has not 
successfully developed a robust autonomous military industrial complex.47   
The defense industry in Japan has accounted for less than 0.6 percent of total 
industrial production and has been credited with producing 90 percent of its military 
equipment at home, much of which has been built under license from U.S. firms.48  
Research and development (R&D) expenditures have shown the same disparity.  Even 
after the Cold War ended and despite sustained increases, Japan was spending less than 
100 billion yen a year on defense R&D while the United States spent more than five 
trillion yen (5% in Japan versus 60% in the U.S. calculated as a percentage of overall 
domestic government R&D).49  In the early 1970s, facing escalating defense costs and 
seemingly unending rearmament, politicians announced that the process was complete 
and aimed to maintain a standard defense force.50  This resulted in the 1976 One Percent 
of GNP Ceiling on military expenditures. 
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Contemporary Japan has emerged as an economic superpower, even though its 
military production has been, by American standards, insignificant.  Richard Samuels has  
used the term “technonationalism” to describe what he identifies as a coherent ideology 
in Japan: 
Japanese military and industrial strategies have been built on a fusion of 
industrial, technology, and national security policies.  This fusion, dubbed 
technonationalism, has persisted in both the prewar era, when Japan used 
military means to achieve its national objectives, and in the post-war 
period, when its policies were more completely commercial.51 
This process has relied on 1) import substitution through domestic production 
(indigenization), 2) technology sharing both vertically within an industry and horizontally 
across multiple commercial sectors (diffusion), and finally 3) a state-directed 
commitment to improve and share information (nurturing).  In Japan, unlike America and 
Europe, there is one economy—an economy that serves both civilian and military 
consumers—that links firms, regions, and the nation. 
For the advocates of rearmament in Japan, domestic production of military 
hardware has been a dual-edged sword.  On the one hand, Japan witnessed incredible 
amounts of technology inflows from America especially during the 1950—1970 
timeframe.  Japan indigenized, diffused, and nurtured these technologies to great 
commercial advantage.  For example, the brakes for the bullet train were based on the 
brakes of the F-104 fighter.52  They also produced and/or purchased large amounts of 
American hardware permitting a degree of interoperability between the two countries.  
However, U.S. licensing for military equipment became troublesome as Japan gained 
greater autonomous defense production capabilities.  The Arms Manufacturing Law of 
1954 gave MITI the authority to control participation in the defense industry.  The result 
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in designating contractors under long-term awards leading to close knit relationship 
between government and the defense industry and informal ties among many of the 
industry’s firms.53 
Historically in Japan, the increased expense of relying on domestic production has 
been estimated to cost, on average, three times more than an equivalent import.54  For 
example, Japan’s M-90 tank has been produced in low volume at a cost of US$7-9 
million compared to US$2.2 million for an M-1 tank, making the M-90 the most 
expensive tank in the world.55  In the process of designing their own indigenous weapons 
systems, Japan also developed indigenous mission requirements as domestic economic 
and technology constraints channeled programs in unique directions.56  This not only 
increased competition for scarce defense dollars but also complicated interoperability 
both domestically and internationally.  With domestic sources available and plenty of 
political pork-barrel projects to hand out, the individual SDF branches suffered from 
frequent redundancy in procurement.  In addition, in an effort to seek efficiency in 
weapons procurement, many domestic products were selected based on terms of logistical 
sustainability (both cost, availability of spare parts, and maintenance turn times) not 
combat efficiency where U.S. equipment were clearly superior.57   
These circumstances, in combination with poor joint planning, limited 
interservice relations, and a lack of effective operational integration, have produced a 
military force that has been characterized as unbalanced. 58   Compared to other 
industrialized countries, despite boasting increasing numbers of modern, technologically 
sophisticated weapon systems, the JSDF cannot operate across the full spectrum of 
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modern mission areas, particularly in force projection and offensive operations.  Of the 
three services, the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) are considered the most 
operationally proficient due in large part to its close postwar interaction with the U.S. 
Navy.  However, all official contingency operations are based on combined operations 
with U.S. forces, and the U.S. 7th Fleet has been counted on to provide shortfall 
capabilities.  Overall, the MSDF has become the most modern, best-equipped in Asia, but 
it lacks ship-based air support and its under-way supply and amphibious transport 
capabilities are weak. 59   The ground forces spent the Cold War aiming north to 
counteract a potential Soviet invasion and are considered the least well equipped and 
least operationally proficient.  This can be largely attributed to its prioritization of 
spending on manpower rather than procurement and a dearth of adequate training areas 
and facilities.60  Overall, the GSDF lacks strategic or even major tactical mobility.   
The Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) operate some of the most advanced, capable 
platforms in the world, and have benefited from a major modernization effort that began 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Chapter Five) in response to new responsibilities.  
However, it does not possess a robust and survivable support structure and lacks adequate 
war reserves of consumables and spares.61  It has no in-flight refueling capability, no 
dedicated strike capability, and only limited long-range air transport.  Operationally, its 
proficiency falls somewhere between the other two forces.  Thus, the defensive 
orientation of the JSDF has led to a relatively unbalanced force structure that is deficient 
in several critical operational and support areas making its ability to contribute to U.S. 
military roles highly problematic both in past and current efforts.   
D. JOINTNESS AND INTEROPERABILITY 
Civilian domination over SDF organization and national defense policy as well as 
inherent economic structures and institutions favoring autonomous defense production 
have impacted jointness and interoperability.  Japan’s difficulty in conducting joint 
operations pre-dates World War II.  Born out the Meiji period, the emerging Japanese 
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army and navy gradually adopted different strategies and perceptions.  The 1889 
constitution stipulated that the emperor had supreme command of both services and 
allowed military authorities the ability to exert independence from the cabinet.62  As 
Japan expanded abroad in the early twentieth century, successes against China and Russia 
exacerbated these tendencies.  The situation became severely dysfunctional by the 1930s 
as each service reported directly to the emperor without any centralizing mechanism to 
coordinate efforts.63  Increasingly, the army fixated on Russia to the north, and the navy 
focused on the rising dominance of America.  Even war failed to bring any resolution as 
the navy never informed the army of its crushing defeat at Midway, and the army was 
preparing to build its own submarines by the end of the war because it did not trust the 
navy.64   
Following the war, jointness and interoperability, both within the Japanese Self 
Defense Force and with U.S. forces, have been slow in evolving.  Joint operations began 
with the establishment of the Joint Staff Council (JSC) in July 1954.  It comprised the 
Chiefs of Staff of the Ground SDF, the Maritime SDF, and Air SDF and aimed at 
ensuring comprehensive and effective administration of the SDF. 65   The National 
Defense Academy had already adopted a joint education system a year earlier in 1953, 
and subsequently established the Joint Staff College in 1961.  However, strategies and 
perceptions have continued to differ, and actual official joint doctrine did not emerge 
until 1968. 66   While the JSC was created to coordinate among services only when 
necessary, the basic position has allowed each service to operate on its own in accordance 
with its own doctrine.   
Internal and external factors have continued to spur gradual improvement.  In the 
wake of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Japan realized the capacity of the US military to 
allocate resources to Japanese defense was diminishing and opened a bilateral dialogue 
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on coordinating military operations.67  By 1978, guidelines were established that set in 
motion a process of joint military studies and exercises based on the notion of functional 
integration of operations between the two militaries.  Subsequently, these guidelines and 
Japan’s extension of its perimeter to include the defense of the 1,000 nautical mile of sea 
lanes led to dramatic increases in exercises between U.S. and Japanese services in the 
1980s (see Chapter Five).  These growing transnational links have played an important 
role in shaping Japanese policy decision.  In comparison, in 1977 only three exercises 
occurred, but by 1989 the number grew to 24. 68   However, the first field training 
involving each service in the Japanese-U.S. joint and combined exercises was held on 
Iwo Jima only in 1998.   
The legal basis for jointness within the SDF has also improved.69  Spurred by the 
end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, and the Kosovo crisis in the 1990s, the critical 
importance of interoperability was demonstrated.  This forced Japan to begin rethinking 
the implications of domestic restrictions on the SDF in the post Cold War era.70  Reacting 
to growing domestic support to assume a larger role in world affairs, SDF forces began 
deploying in limited numbers for non-combat support roles in a number of U.N. 
peacekeeping operations.  In March 1999, official amendments to the defense agency 
establishment law also improved coordination of SDF components.   
Finally, the lessons learned from these events led to a call in 2002 for a 
comprehensive study of joint operations with the Japanese Defense Agency.  Tentative 
results have identified the need to switch from a posture in which each service of the SDF 
operates independently to one in which joint operations are the norm.71  In addition, the 
need to transform current operations to allow forces to share information simultaneously, 
carry out duties swiftly and effectively, and exercise unified command and control were 
highlighted.  The Defense Agency stated, “the success or failure of plans…often hinges 
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on whether or not information and communications technology can be utilized, and joint 
operations posture must be established that allow maximum utilization of the latest 
military technology in SDF operations.” 72   It seems as if Japan may finally be 
recognizing the need to prove itself a credible ally by improving interoperability with 
U.S. forces and adapting to new high-tech systems and doctrines.   
E. DEFENSE POLICY ACTORS 
Japan’s security policy has exhibited rigidity on issues of military security 
especially in comparison to the flexibility shown on questions of economic security.73  
National security policy has been formulated and implemented largely by three ministries 
(MOFA, MOF, and MITI) as well as the JDA.74  As illustrated above, these agents have, 
to varying degrees, answered to the competing norms of 1) supporting the bilateralism of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance and 2) catering to the domestic sentiment of anti-militarism.  
Regarding military security issues, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the JDA are the primary central bureaucratic organizations.  
The Cabinet Legislation Bureau, an elite unit that oversees all legal aspects of 
government policy, has also played an important role especially concerning the 
interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution.   
The MOFA has been responsible for Tokyo’s overall security policy, and its main 
mission has focused on maintaining a stable relationship with Washington.  From this 
perspective, on matters of military modernization the MOFA has tended to favor 
procurement from the United States to help with balance of payments problems in 
ongoing trade negations and also to remain consistent with broader Japanese-U.S. ties 
and interests. 75   The MOF has exerted the greatest civilian control by effectively 
providing the brake on the unrestrained growth of both the JSDF and the defense 
industries.76  It has preferred the lower cost of off-the-shelf foreign equipment but has 
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been convinced to go along with the policy of domestic sourcing for the presumed 
national benefits of indigenous defense production.   
MITI’s involvement in security policy has grown in correlation to Japan’s rising 
economic muscle.  It has been the primary promoter of diffusion of high technology 
throughout the Japanese economy.  As stated earlier, its authority to control participation 
in the defense industry has resulted in a system in which the JDA distributes contracts 
and has almost total discretion in designating contractors.  The JDA, however, lacks 
institutional autonomy.  With four of its eleven top posts reserved for outside officials, 
other ministries have placed their officials inside the agency while subordinating 
uniformed JSDF officers to civilians thus maintaining an atmosphere of profound distrust 
of the professional military. 77   Overall, these effects have evolved into a defense 
economy that has been built around close links between business and government which 
reflect a far-reaching subordination of military to political and economic requirements.  
Furthermore, Japan has consistently chosen economic competitiveness over military 
prowess, seeking technological autonomy without risking its security arrangements with 
the United States.78 
F. SUMMARY 
This then is the environment in which military change must struggle within.  The 
deck is already stacked and the impediments are formidable.  So, then how does change 
occur in Japanese defense policy?  According to Keddell, the distinct lack of a strategic 
doctrine and controversy over efforts to establish one, mean that political conflicts over 
defense will be managed by incremental measures.79  This incremental process is heavily 
influenced by the bureaucracy’s vertical stove piping and strong autonomy which delay 
the ministerial process of consultation and consensus building. 80   Thus, changes in 
defense policy are generated not necessarily by defense concerns, per se, but by non-
defense-related factors such as shifts in the level of U.S. pressure, changes in the power 
balance between the LDP and opposition parties in the Diet, and the degree of factional 
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strife within the LDP.  Second, the emphasis on managing conflicting pressures that 
change over time means that there is little concern about the contents of defense policy—
what matters is that conflict is either minimized or avoided.  Indeed, Japan since 1945 has 
given greater priority to retaining control over its armed forces than to maintaining 
military readiness.81   
However, as noted above some substantive changes have taken place.  From the 
mid-1970s through the 1990s, Japan’s civil-military relations gradually became more 
normalized.  In particular, 1) civilian political control shifted from a bureaucratically 
managed system to control by elected officials, 2) the balance of power and stature of the 
Defense Agency has improved in relation with other ministries and agencies, and 3) 
popular attitudes have shifted from fear and distrust to one of recognition for the SDF as 
a necessary institution.82   
Over the postwar period, Japan’s security planning process has revolved around 
the contentious domestic issue of defining the purpose of the SDF as well as containment 
of the military’s institutional influence in national policy formulation.83  It has not been 
until the national policymaking process gained greater domestic support that the Japanese 
government has been able to create a policy dialogue with the U.S. government to 
establish procedures and goals for cooperation between the two militaries.  The three case 
studies presented in the following chapters will highlight the evolution of the 
commitments Japan has made over successive decades of the postwar period.  From 
utilizing U.S. equipment/licensing and sharing regional roles and responsibilities in the 
Cold War era to the potential for collective self-defense in the post-Cold war period, the 
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IV. CASE STUDY 1:  REARMAMENT UNDER U.S. ALIGNMENT 
AND FOUR DEFENSE PLANS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following defeat in World War II, total military disarmament, and U.S. 
occupation, the Japanese government accepted alignment with Washington in 1951.  
Over the first three decades of the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan alliance was codified as a 
defense policy in 1957, strengthened through revision in 1960, and reaffirmed in 1970.  
Moreover, through a series of four defense plans and a combination of direct military aid, 
technology inflows, and inclusion in an open Western trading system, Japan was able to 
build and employ an increasing array of sophisticated military hardware despite strong 
public distrust and political infighting surrounding security policy formation and SDF 
legitimacy.  Even as the economic fortunes of Japan achieved unprecedented growth rates 
and external threats changed, the U.S.-Japan alliance was an important vehicle in 
promoting LDP political legitimacy and allowing a nationalist agenda of continued 
rearmament.  Subsequently, Japanese elites repeatedly used the alliance as a means of 
achieving domestic political support for continued growth of Japan’s defense capability.  
This chapter investigates Tokyo’s commitment to rearm in spite of heated opposition 
from multiple fronts.  Military change in this period involved establishing the building 
blocks of rearmament (equipment, doctrine, and organization) under a U.S.-imposed 
constitution and the political necessity to align with Washington and then maintain and 
strengthen that relationship.   
B. BACKGROUND 
When the U.S. occupation of Japan ended in 1952, regional and global events had 
created a much different environment than anticipated by the allied forces in 1945.  As 
early as March of 1948, George Kennan delivered Washington’s message that MacArthur 
must modify his programs and place a new priority on economic recovery and political 
stability.   Moreover by November of the same year, Washington authorized the creation 
of a paramilitary force of 150,000 to supplement the police.84  MacArthur refused to 
exercise this option until 1950 when the outbreak of the Korean War forced his hand as 
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the bulk of U.S. forces were sent to Korea.  With the looming potential of the remaining 
U.S. forces being overrun, Japan organized 75,000 men as the National Police Reserve.  
This paramilitary organization, however, was established without official Diet 
coordination or national consensus and reinforced existing fears that the military posed a 
threat to democracy.85  These fears were further elevated since these troops were seen as 
a government means to control internal security and could therefore be used for 
continued crackdown on leftist movements and labor unrest.  In talks held in January and 
February 1951, Secretary of State Dulles requested that Japan rearm to include an army 
up to 350,000.  Publicly, Prime Minister Yoshida rejected this request citing regional 
fears of renewed Japanese militarism, lack of public support, and the need to concentrate 
on economic recovery; however, in a secret memorandum on 3 February 1951, he 
conceded to Dulles that Japan would create land and sea security forces totaling 50,000.86  
Renamed the National Safety Force in 1952, they officially became the Japanese Self-
Defense Force (JSDF) in 1954. 
As noted in the previous chapter, Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, however, 
presented a number of legal and political hurdles to fielding “normal” military capability 
under Japan’s newly adopted pacifism.  Conservative elites of this period justified JSDF 
formation using the U.N. charter interpretation by arguing that Japan possessed the 
inalienable right to defend itself and that a military with solely defensive capability did 
not violate the spirit of the constitution.87  This interpretation still stands today as the 
foundation of SDF legitimacy and has resulted in the pursuit of an exclusively defense-
oriented policy and four general prohibitions on the exercise of military power.88  The 
first prohibition has required the limiting of Japan’s military capacity to the minimum 
necessary for the purposes of self-defense.  This “minimum” limit has been left open-
ended and ambiguously interpreted to be a function of prevailing international situations 
and existing standards of military technology.  In general, this has restricted the 
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accumulation of “war-potential” as prohibited in article 9, and offensive weapons (e.g., 
aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, ICBMs, etc) have therefore been regarded as 
unconstitutional.  Oddly enough, nuclear weapons as a strictly defensive capability to 
ensure national survival have specifically not been ruled unconstitutional.89   
The second prohibition involved defining the right of self-defense where 
conditions must present a) an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression that b) cannot 
be dealt with by other means, and c) the use of force will be confined to the minimum 
necessary level.  Third, the geographic scope of self-defense has been constrained by 
changing legal restrictions over the years, and the Japanese government has continued to 
argue that it is not necessarily confined to Japanese territory.  Finally, the fourth 
prohibition has denied participation in collective self-defense.  Even though allowed 
under article 7 of the U.N. Charter, the Japanese government has maintained that 
exercising this right would violate the minimum necessary force for self-defense and is 
therefore unconstitutional.   
Consequently, during these early years, a mixture of public distrust, anti-
militaristic sentiment, strong ideological polarization surrounding the emerging Cold 
War, and U.S. pressure to rearm created a number of contentious defense compromises.  
For example, the first Japanese government policy constraint was the 1954 Ban on 
Overseas Dispatch.   The political necessity for this ban was the result of two primary 
factors.  First, there was considerable U.S. pressure to sign the 1953 Mutual Security 
Agreement which offered military equipment (e.g., financial and technological assistance 
for licensed production of a series of U.S. designed tanks, ships, and jet aircraft) and 
other monetary support in exchange for Japan’s continued enhancement of its defense 
capabilities.90  Second, opposition party pressure repeatedly called for the limiting of 
defense capabilities based on the fears highlighted above.   
This debate was resolved by the first of many political compromises that would 
allow, yet at the same time, constrain defense enhancements.  In this instance, the SDF 
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and JDA were established under the two 1954 Defense Laws (under strict civilian control 
as noted previously), but only after the upper House of Councillors imposed legislation to 
prohibit the sending of troops abroad.91  This pattern of “restrictive consent” has granted 
tacit political legitimacy to expanding military capabilities and is an important 
component of defense policymaking still today.  In 1954, this meant that the Japanese 
government could officially organize and equip existing forces as a standing military, but 
these troops were specifically prohibited from being used outside Japanese territory for 
domestic or alliance (e.g., U.S. entanglements) purposes.   
Furthermore, in this tumultuous political environment, the domestic political 
scene consolidated in 1955 with the merger of the Liberal Party and Democratic Party.  
This action ensured political elites a conservative centrist foundation from which to 
provide political stability while battling left and right wing influence both within the new 
party as well as from other opposition parties.  Despite this consolidation, internal 
political debate and consensus building, especially on defense issues, still proved to be 
difficult and time consuming.  Inherent bureaucratic vertical stove piping and strong 
autonomy delayed the process of ministerial consultation and consensus building and 
exacerbated the divisive political infighting.92  For example, it required nearly three years 
from the 1954 organization of the defense establishment before general defense 
guidelines were officially recognized in the 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense 
(BPND).  As Japan’s first statement of its individual military security policy, it delineated 
the nation’s gradual defense buildup within the U.S.-Japan security alliance, thus 
predicating its own incremental expansion of defense capabilities on developments in the 
bilateral security relationship.93  The BPND remains unchanged today as the foundation 
of Japan’s security policy.   
The BPND opened the door to the quantitative and qualitative buildup of SDF 
capabilities, and in combination with the First Defense Plan (19581960) it allowed 
bilateral discussions of revising the inequalities of the 1951 security treaty as well as 
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reducing U.S. troop strength.94  These efforts set the framework for the SDF and were 
designed to compensate for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces by increasing the 
GSDF.  However, the government handling and public reaction leading to the 1960 
revision of the security treaty highlighted public concerns and hyper-sensitivity to 
defense issues.  While the renewal redressed the unequal terms along lines comparable to 
other U.S. security treaties in Asia, millions protested the event eventually toppling Prime 
Minister Kishi’s government whose tactics supporting stronger defense capabilities had 
stoked fears of a return to the pre-war domestic order.95 
In comparison to the highly contentious issues of the 1950s, the 1960s witnessed 
relatively broad domestic political stability in Japan.96  Additionally, the passive and 
noncommittal mode of policymaking seen in the previous decade became more 
entrenched and institutionalized in the political process.97  Prime Minister Ikeda’s efforts 
to shift the debate from foreign policy and defense issues to economic development 
eschewed controversy over security policy and instead sought to improve the material life 
of the people through his “income-doubling” policy and resulted in his push to gently 
strengthen the SDF.98  Japan’s East Asian developmental model combined the benefits of 
a favorable international climate and a pattern of domestic collaboration between 
government and the local economy. 99   In 1960, Japan had the fifth largest world 
economy, and by 1970 it would be second.  In this period, Japan’s economy grew at an 
average annual rate in excess of ten percent.  In comparison, annual per capita growth 
rate from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 to 1940 was respectable at 1.5 percent but that 
was no better than that of the United States over the same period.100  Nonetheless, 
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international conditions, domestic politics, and continuing U.S. pressure forced Tokyo 
once again to accept political compromises on defense increases.   
The Second Defense Plan (1962–1966) continued gradual defense improvements 
and focused on building the foundation of MSDF and ASDF capabilities through more 
weapons procurement.101  Up to this point, Japan’s lack of direct defense cooperation 
with the United States had met relatively little resistance.  Rebuilding and then surpassing 
pre-war economic production was the primary focus.  Japan’s contribution came 
primarily from filling orders for war-generated goods and allowing rear-based U.S. 
troops to support ongoing conflicts (e.g., Korea and Southeast Asia) from its territory.  
However, faced with growing commitments in Vietnam, Washington increased pressure 
for Japan to assume greater defense responsibility in the region and began cutting U.S. 
grants and aid for defense hardware eventually ending direct military aid in 1968.102  The 
loss of this assistance was substantial.  Through September 1966, these grants had 
provided 5.7 billion yen in equipment and had built nearly all of the GSDF’s antitank 
weapons and artillery, one-third of the MSDF’s tonnage, and half of the ASDF’s 
fighters.103  Subsequent SDF calls to replace this lost assistance by increasing defense 
spending gradually to two percent of GNP during the next five years found little support 
in political circles. 
While providing indirect cooperation on U.S. efforts in Vietnam, the Sato 
administration resisted full-scale assistance as witnessed by the 1967 ban on the export of 
arms to communist countries.104  Moreover, in 1968, it also announced the three non-
nuclear principles fueled in large measure by rising tensions over China’s continued 
nuclear testing since 1964.105  The Third Defense Plan (1967–1971) was particularly 
controversial since it called for improvements in air and antisubmarine warfare 
capabilities.  Nike-Hercules missiles, which could be fitted with nuclear warheads, and F-
4 Phantom Jets, which as a fighter-bomber could perform both interdiction and bombing 
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roles, were hotly debated over their potential offensive nature.106  Critics contended that 
priority on qualitative improvements shifted SDF capabilities from a defensive to an 
offensive character as well as indicated Japan’s intention to assist U.S. military strategy 
in the region.107  Ultimately, the opposition party pressure succeeded leading to the 
removal of bombing devices in 1968 and mid-air refueling devices in 1973.108 
The defense debate also continued as large-scale protests surfaced regarding the 
ten-year renewal date of the revised 1960 security treaty.  However, with a more affluent 
society, the winding down of the Vietnam War witnessed by Nixon’s July 1969 Guam 
Doctrine, and the November 1969 agreement to return Okinawa (which had remained 
under U.S. administration) to Japanese sovereignty, the public outcries failed to generate 
significant political impact.109  Subsequently, since the treaty did not need to be revised it 
was automatically extended.  However, the Nixon shocks of the early 1970s (Guam 
Doctrine, rapprochement with China, and dropping of the gold standard) coupled with 
Japan’s continuing rise as the world’s second largest economy brought elevated pressure 
for Japan to do more.  Moreover, the general stability of the 1960s was altered by several 
external events that shaped Japan’s economic environment.   
First, the Bretton Woods fixed-rate exchange system ended in 1971 leading to the 
subsequent depreciation of the dollar.  Second, the oil embargo beginning in 1973 as 
OPEC reacted to the Arab-Israeli War highlighted the frailties of Japan’s export-led 
growth system.  The severe impact of this event resulted in both a zero rate of economic 
growth in 1974, the lowest in postwar history, and unprecedented unemployment.110  
Finally, rising trade surpluses which had first materialized in the mid-1960s led to 
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influence in the region and the transformation in the structure of the international system 
in the early 1970s, these events spurred Tokyo to re-address its overall foreign policy and 
bilateral relations with Washington.111 
The Fourth Defense Plan (1972–1976) re-ignited the political controversy 
surrounding growing offensive capability as well as the need to potentially limit rising 
defense expenditures.  The cost of each successive defense plan had nearly doubled—
First Defense Plan (464.1 billion yen), Second Defense Plan (1.3 trillion yen), and Third 
Defense Plan (2.53 trillion yen).112  With the Fourth Defense Plan projections ranging 
from 5.7 to 6.5 trillion yen, the annual rate of increase calculated to more than 18.5 
percent.  Adding fuel to the fire, Defense Agency director, Nakasone Yasuhiro, also 
suggested revising the BPND to allow the SDF to assume a central role in Japan’s 
defense and urged a more autonomous defense posture to eventually achieve air and 
naval superiority around Japan.113  This action was intended to relegate the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty to a secondary role and would allow Japan to contribute to the 
maintenance of world peace in accordance with its economic status.   
The Sato administration and LDP leadership, however, avoided pursuing these 
proposals due to a combination of fears over foreign and domestic reaction.114  Juggling 
the demands of the continued strengthening of individual defense capabilities, 
maintaining the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and restraining excessive buildup of 
the SDF, the Japanese government stabilized SDF expansion through the 1976 National 
Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and garnered opposition party support for the program 
by the accompanying One Percent of GNP Ceiling.115  These issues will be addressed in 
connection with the expanding regional role of the SDF in the next case study. 
C. ASSESSMENT 
In summary, military change from a Japanese perspective during the first two 
decades of the Cold War was significant.  Remarkably, the four defense programs over a 
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period of 20 years built, from a state of total disarmament, a potent and capable regional 
military force.  Military security policies of the 1930s and 1940s had been discredited and 
forcibly discarded.  Furthermore, a defense community based solely on national self-
defense was politically sanctioned and then organized, equipped, and trained under the 
watchful eye of a wary and suspect population.  The Japanese government constructed 
new military capabilities under completely transformed social, economic, and political 
conditions and constraints.  A re-invigorated democratic process, involving political elites, 
multi-party representation, and consultation, complicated and divided the political debate 
especially on defense issues.  Furthermore, Japan’s acceptance of the partial peace of the 
1951 San Francisco Treaty and the bilateral security treaty also led to further political and 
security isolation from the region.  This was evidenced by the slow process of 
normalization of relations with its East Asian neighbors—ROC on Taiwan in 1951, 
USSR in 1956 (still no peace treaty), ROK in 1965, and PRC in 1978—just to name a 
few.   
During this period, the Bretton Woods system provided 25 years of stability in the 
international trade system.  This stability was based on a large, open U.S. market, 
extensive developmental assistance, and the U.S. security umbrella.116  In addition, the 
Japanese political structure of the LDP’s “1955 system” created a bureaucracy largely 
autonomous from politics that allowed close collaboration between public and private 
sectors and curbed the power of labor unions and other popular movements.   
Ultimately, the early defense budgets were influenced primarily by three 
factors.117  First, politicians gave economic recovery the highest priority in government 
spending in the ravaged postwar environment.  Second, resentment and anti-militarism 
within the general population held the military responsible for the disastrous conditions.  
Third, there was a lack of agreement in the domestic political arena as to what level of 
defense was both appropriate and lawful under the constitution.  Tokyo’s ensuing debate 
on rearmament produced a series of defense constraints that resulted from a variety of 
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factors including public opinion, domestic political struggles, opposition parties, U.S. 
pressure, and changing international conditions.   
Three important trends stand out from this period.  First, U.S. pressure based on 
Washington’s interests to contain the spread of communism provided the initial 
opportunity for Japan to rearm.  The alliance was critical for supplying the necessary 
monetary assistance, the constant expectation for Japan to assume its own defense, and 
the protective security umbrella allowing it to debate and enact slow, measured policy 
responses.  The alliance, therefore, acted as both an accelerator and a moderator.  Absent 
these influences, Tokyo probably would have been unable to field a large military by the 
end of the 1950s and modernize it in the 1960s due largely to rampant public anti-
militarism, a divisive political environment, and unstable external conditions.   
Second, rearmament—while justified in direct reaction to the dangerous Cold 
War security environment—was largely shaped by domestic politics.  The long list of 
legal, administrative, and bureaucratic constraints were imposed by political means to 
restrain and/or limit the growth and use of military capabilities in security policy.  
Additionally, these restricted measures—dispatch of troops, arms export, nuclear 
weapons, etc.—served the dual function of allowing politicians to avoid the potential of 
being entangled in ongoing U.S. intervention in the region and appease tenuous and 
contentious opposition party support for maintaining a “minimal” military force.  While a 
preponderance of external security threats—a militarized Korean Peninsula, a nuclear 
China, communist spread to Southeast Asia, Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, etc—
could have justified greater military aspirations for Japan, the fragile domestic political 
scene dictated much less as political elites depended on consensus and compromise to 
maintain their hold on power. 
Lastly, the bonds of the bilateral alliance were repeatedly strengthened despite 
internal and external political opportunities to pursue other alternatives.  Domestic 
Japanese protests against the 1960 revision of the security treaty, the Vietnam War, and 
the 1970 extension of the alliance could have been leveraged to demand more autonomy 
from Washington especially as significant events like China’s break from the Sino-Soviet 
strategic relationship and rapprochement with the West signaled a shift in the balance of 
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power in the region.  The end of U.S. military aid to Japan in 1968, poor American 
results in Vietnam, and a booming Japanese economy also presented an opportune time to 
pursue other policy options.  Nonetheless, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Japanese 
government continued to choose U.S. alignment under the 1955 system.  And as 
demonstrated throughout this case study the bilateral alliance served in many respects as 
a stabilizing effect within Japanese domestic politics.   
Regarding military change, Japan had to overcome significant and very unique 
challenges.  Like other militaries, it had to not only allocate the appropriate resources to 
modernize its forces but more importantly, at the same time, it had to completely re-
establish the political support to legitimize this effort while only allowed to use the 
“defensive” half of the playbook.  The next case study will highlight the continuation of 
Japanese policymakers’ use of “restrictive consent” in defense issues in the mid-1970s 
and again illustrate Tokyo’s willingness to strengthen the alliance and permit new 
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V. CASE STUDY 2:  THE 1,000NM DEFENSE PERIMETER AND 
REGIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE 1980S 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency publicly stated that 
Japan should defend key transport lanes within 1,000 nautical miles of the Japanese 
coast.  In May 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki’s announcement following a U.S.-Japan 
summit in Washington D.C. expanded the 30-year focus of the JSDF from defending the 
12 nautical mile territorial waters surrounding Japan to the 1,000 nautical mile defense of 
the sea lines of communications (SLOC).  Furthermore, in 1983 Prime Minister 
Nakasone, while visiting the United States, said that Japan should become an “unsinkable 
aircraft carrier” and also be able to control the Sea of Japan straits.118  This new defense 
perimeter encompassed sea lanes reaching approximately from Tokyo to Guam to the 
Philippines.  Together, these represented a fundamental break from prior decades and 
legitimized the strategic requirement for better submarines, ships, and air defenses.  
Correspondingly, the Nakasone administration began to build up Japan’s quantitative and 
qualitative military strength in support of U.S. strategy in East Asia.119  Furthermore, 
after more than three decades of debate, Japan had finally agreed to a play a military role 
in regional security affairs.120  The primary internal and external political, economic, and 
security factors driving this decision will be examined in this chapter.  
B. BACKGROUND 
Sea lane defense emerged after more than thirty years in the international context 
of the evolving Cold War political economy noted in the previous two chapters.  
However, in contrast to the good-feeling growth of the 1960s, the 1970s heralded 
sobering economic reality.  It was in these challenging fiscal times, with U.S. influence 
declining in the region, that the Japanese government attempted to re-adjust the trajectory 
of increasing costs associated with successive defense plans exacerbated by the loss of 
U.S. assistance.  In addition to growing concern within the JDA, MOFA, and the LDP 
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over the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the region, these strategic concerns were 
also influenced by continued political losses to domestic opposition parties.121  The 1976 
National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) was presented as the political answer to both 
of these strategic and domestic issues. 
The NDPO represented Japan’s first attempt to outline principles of defense in 
comparison to the military force structure necessary to achieve them.  In the superpower 
détente of the 1970s, policymakers and defense analysts assumed that the United States 
and Soviet Union would avoid nuclear war; military equilibrium would exist among 
Washington, Beijing, and Moscow; and that security arrangements and superpower 
balance would prevent large-scale aggression against Japan.122  In comparison, previous 
defense capabilities had been based on the required defense force concept which dictated 
that force levels be capable of matching existing aggressor capabilities.  The NDPO, 
however, shifted to the standard defense force concept which factored in existing 
capabilities as well as intentions of potential aggressors.123  In contrast to the fears and 
costs associated with the steady buildup of the past, this new change in planning 
necessitated only a modest SDF expansion and lowered threat definition levels from 
coping with major wars to small-scale conflicts.   
More importantly, however, prominent SDF officials voiced harsh criticisms of 
these potential changes.  They argued this new assessment of the regional security 
environment was overly optimistic and that the standard defense force concept was 
unrealistic, particularly since it was based purely on peacetime conditions.124  Regarded 
by the SDF as vague and ineffective, the NDPO, nonetheless, gained political support.  
Ultimately, due to its quantitative constraints, NDPO success hinged on defense planners’ 
pursuit of qualitative improvements as policymakers continued to emphasize the 
importance of U.S.-Japan security arrangements.125  Thus, as with the 1957 BPND, the 
U.S-Japan alliance would once again be codified as official defense policy. 
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However in addition to the obvious strategic considerations of declining U.S. 
influence, the NDPO was just one part of a multi-pronged effort to appease opposition 
party pressures which had gained greater public support as witnessed in Diet elections.  
LDP efforts to place constraints on Japan’s defense buildup in the mid-1970s had 
increasingly resulted from the need to address declining LDP electoral vote share—
dropping from 57 percent of the vote (296 seats) in 1960 to 41.8 percent (249 seats) by 
1976.126  Moreover, the nature of the controversy over defense issues had shifted in the 
1970s relative to ideological battles of the prior decades.  As other pressing issues gained 
saliency (e.g., slowing domestic growth especially after the oil crisis, China’s support of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance while Soviet troops amassed on its borders, and the U.S. cease-
fire agreement in Vietnam), the defense debate within Japanese political circles had 
transitioned from legitimacy of the SDF’s existence to more matter-of-fact fiscal 
restraints.  These developments undercut opposition party criticism of Japan’s defense 
buildup while declining government revenues also forced the Ministry of Finance to exert 
greater pressure to reign in defense spending which with the proposed Fifth Defense Plan 
had grown to estimates ranging from 8.4 to 10.4 trillion yen.127 
Like past defense constraints, a new “restrictive consent” option—the One 
Percent of GNP Ceiling on defense expenditures—became the moderating compromise 
used to push through military change.  It originated out of the downward trend from the 
two percent defense spending figures of the early 1950s to the less than one percent norm 
first realized starting in 1967.  As early as 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka emphasized that 
a consensus had formed around this one percent figure and even received tacit consent 
from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in normalization talks in September 1972.128  This cap 
was therefore utilized to garner domestic political support in conjunction with the debate 
to enact the new NDPO.  For example, in 1976 the LDP targeted the largest centrist 
opposition party, the Komeito, and offered this one percent cap in exchange for its 
support of the NDPO and more importantly recognition of the SDF itself.129   
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As additional evidence of the political necessity to cater to opposition party 
concerns, Prime Minister Miki also expanded the prohibition on arms exports to include 
all other countries, further restricting the export of defense-related technology.  However, 
continued poor electoral showing of the LDP forced his resignation in December 1976 in 
favor of Prime Minister Fukuda and again highlighted the sensitivity required of the LDP 
in regards to opposition party platforms and criticisms.  These defense constraints 
(NDPO, One Percent Cap, and Arms Export Ban), formalized by the Miki administration 
(1974–1976) in 1976, recognized the strength of the anti-militarist legacy.  More 
importantly, though, they also demonstrated how far the government had progressed in 
building a consensus on the existence and size of the SDF, and its growing acceptance as 
a legitimate instrument of state policy.130  Moreover, once again, these measures largely 
reflected domestic conditions and bore little relation to the international balance of 
military forces outside the confines of the U.S.-Japan alliance.131   
With the NDPO in place, qualitative improvements in equipment and greater 
U.S.-Japan defense cooperation were emphasized especially in sea and air defense 
capabilities.  With declining U.S. troop strength throughout Asia and growing Soviet 
capability, Washington stepped up its calls for burden sharing, focusing the debate on 
improving the military capabilities and interoperability of U.S. and allied forces as part of 
the U.S. strategy to counter the Soviet military buildup.132  U.S. pressure led to the 
December 1976 decision to acquire F-15 interceptor aircraft and was due in part to U.S. 
trade and defense frictions as well as the inadequacies of Japan’s air defenses exposed 
when a Soviet pilot defected and landed his aircraft on a Japanese airfield in September 
1976.133  In June 1977, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown declared that the United 
States expected the JSDF to shoulder their share by assuming defense of the branch sea 
lanes to Japan while U.S. forces would secure the maritime routes across the Pacific.134  
Prior to the Soviet buildup, the U.S. Navy had been able to match Soviet naval 
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capabilities on its own, however, under the NDPO framework, this type of defense 
cooperation was unacceptable to the Japanese government since it required significant 
policy change outlining new and expanding roles and missions.   
The 1978 Defense Guidelines for Defense Cooperation emerged, as highlighted 
above, as Japan realized the capacity of the U.S. military to allocate resources to Japan’s 
defense was diminishing.  Having spent more than two decades subordinating national 
security policy to civilian control, it finally became politically feasible to link national 
military strategy to greater coordination with the United States.135  This renewed bilateral 
dialogue set in motion a process of joint military studies and exercises based on the 
notion of functional integration of operations between the two militaries.  Nonetheless, 
due to political constraints, these efforts primarily equated to monetary outlays in place of 
actual revised strategy or policy changes to the NDPO.  These burden-sharing measures 
were evident in the 1978 decision by Tokyo to share expenses for U.S. forces in Japan.  
Known as a “sympathy budget,” these outlays were intended to help alleviate the U.S. 
financial burden.  Another measure involved increasing Japan’s foreign aid allocations 
that were an alternate means by which Japan could contribute to stability in countries of 
interest without requiring military buildup.  Also in 1978, under U.S. prodding the 
Japanese government shortened the term for doubling its share of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) from five to three years eventually making Japan the largest aid donor 
by the end of the 1980s.136   
The 1980s brought increasing calls for Japan to do more.  The Reagan 
administration’s major thrust of its defense policy was to persuade allies to share more of 
the defense burden.137  Ultimately, this became the main theme in the U.S.-Japan summit 
talks on May 7-8, 1981 in Washington D.C. when Prime Minister Suzuki promised that 
Japan would make more defense efforts and would assume sea lane defense.  Moreover, 
Japan undertook an expansive modernization effort to upgrade its forces to meet the new 
mission requirements driven by the need for better submarines, ships, and air defenses.  
Enhanced by years of technology flow from the West, defense co-production from U.S. 
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licensing, and rising defense budgets of the 1970s, the JSDF emerged in the 1980s as a 
formidable force that achieved regional military superiority in all forms of conventional 
weaponry.138   Military security “normalization” efforts by Prime Minister Nakasone 
(1982–87) also demonstrated Tokyo’s desire to pursue a more independent foreign 
policy, albeit incrementally.   
By the early 1980s, several other factors further underscored the need for changes.  
These included the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia, the escalation of the Iran-Iraq War, and the continued Soviet force build up in 
the East Asia.139  In addition, a general consensus developed in Japanese political circles 
that defense spending had to be increased in order to avoid trade and defense friction with 
the United States.  Despite Prime Minister Suzuki’s declaration in July 1980 that 
financial reconstruction was the government’s top priority, the decision to exempt 
defense expenditures from the negative ceilings for 1982 was reached between his office 
and Finance Minister Watanabe.  Concern over public opinion, opposition parties, 
widespread support for the One Percent of GNP Ceiling, and priority on fiscal restraint 
restrained the LDP’s ability to significantly raise defense expenditures.140  However, by 
the early 1980s this was politically more acceptable than policy change.  Thus, during 
this period unlike most other large expenditures in the Japanese budget that witnessed 
declining budgets, the defense budget remained relatively constant as a percentage of 
overall expenditures.  Furthermore, Japanese officials finally relented to U.S. pressure in 
the late 1980s and temporarily exceeded the standard one percent cap.  Again, this was 
easier than changing official policy. 
Despite these constraints, Japan acquired defense capabilities that enabled it to 
perform a regional security role unforeseen by the 1976 NDPO.  Although the NDPO did 
not envisage sea lane defense, the SDF’s assumption of this role in the 1980s and plans to 
close the straits around Japan to Soviet naval vessels in an emergency were seen as proof 
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of Japan’s incorporation into U.S. strategy.141  For many the NDPO was dual pronged.  It 
limited defense buildup based on détente in the mid-1970s, but also served as a cloak for 
military expansion.  The assumption of sea lane defense, in combination with other 
measures requiring a more active military role for the SDF were a concrete manifestation 
of the closer military cooperation developing between Japan and the United States.142  By 
1991, Japan had approximately 60 destroyers (three times those of the U.S. Seventh 
Fleet); 100 P-3Cs, (five times those of the U.S. Seventh Fleet); and 300 interceptors (200 
F-15s and 100 F-4s and more than the United States had in Japan, Korea, and the 
Philippines combined).  This equaled the number of interceptors the USAF had defending 
the continental United States.143  Irrespective of the change in the external security 
environment, Nakasone’s Japan was seen as becoming a military big power.  This was 
evidenced by the growing percentage of the budget being devoted to military hardware 
rather than personnel and provisions, up ten percent in the decade to 1987, and the 
acquisition of a range of sophisticated weaponry—forty-one P-3C Orion anti-submarine 
patrol planes, eight E-2C Hawkeye early-warning planes, and ninety-four F-15 Eagle air-
to-air fighters during the early and mid-1980s.144   
More importantly, though, the U.S. Department of Defense’s emphasis on 
enhancing interoperability and readiness of bilateral forces led to an increase in the scope 
and frequency of joint military maneuvers.145  Four sets of joint studies were pursued 
over the 1980s.  Moreover, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which reorganized the 
U.S. command structure around the Joint Chiefs of Staff, applied additional pressure 
from the United States.  Individual SDF service components had traditionally conducted 
various limited combined exercises with only their specific U.S. counterparts—the 
MSDF started collaboration with the U.S. Navy in the 1950s, the ASDF exercised with 
the USAF starting in the 1970s, and the GSDF has worked with the U.S. Army and 
Marines since the 1980s.   
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However, the emphasis on bilateral cooperation witnessed new levels of 
participation and responsibilities.  Combined air exercises, started in 1978, increased 
from three to twelve per year by 1981 and to sixteen by 1987.  Joint naval maneuvers 
increased from three in the late 1970s to eight per year by 1984, while MSDF 
participation in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises with U.S., Canadian, New 
Zealand, and Australian forces began in 1980 and continue today every two years.  Joint 
U.S.-Japanese ground force maneuvers also occurred for the first time in 1981.  By the 
end of the 1980s with greater interoperability between bilateral forces, the JSDF were 
considered capable of contributing to Pacific deterrence which would enable Japan to 
block the passage of Soviet warships from Vladivostok to the Pacific Ocean, to mine the 
applicable straits, to provide an air defense screen around Japan, and to conduct 
surveillance activities on Soviet forces. 146   Once again, despite these dramatic 
assumptions of responsibilities, the LDP avoided revising the NDPO or permanently 
dropping the One Percent of GNP Ceiling to avoid trouble with opposition parties in the 
Diet. 
C. ASSESSMENT 
In many ways, Prime Minister Suzuki’s acceptance of sea lane defense was a 
nonevent at the time it transpired.  In fact, he purportedly denied this commitment later in 
response to negative public reaction and East Asian nations’ fears of an expanded defense 
role.  Nonetheless, its importance regarding SDF military change in the 1980s is key to 
understanding how defense cooperation expanded Japan’s defensive shield.  Furthermore, 
this cooperation happened during a period when growing trade and technology transfer 
friction created adversarial positions between the United States and Japan that constantly 
threatened to undermine security and political cooperation.147   
The mid-to-late 1970s were also pivotal in opening the door to small yet 
successful attacks on the legal, political, and societal limits placed on national security 
policy in the prior three decades.  Bracketed with the NDPO and the One Percent of GNP 
Ceiling, the LDP further legitimized the existence of the SDF within domestic political 
circles, forcing future defense conflict to be debated primarily by means of the budgetary 
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process.  In the 1980s, this fiscal debate became the platform of choice for the Japanese 
government to deal with both domestic opposition and alliance friction.   
The three trends from the first case study show continuity in this period as well.  
First, U.S. pressure continued to demand more defense participation from Tokyo.  
However, this time it included more than just Cold War threats and was compounded by 
trade and other issues.  Having successfully recovered from the war devastation, Japan 
was now expected to carry its fair share of regional defense burdens and expenses.  
Second, domestic politics continued to be a primary shaper of defense issues as the 
ideological conflicts surrounding defense policies diminished and fiscal realities took 
center stage.  And lastly, despite changing international conditions, conflict with the 
United States over numerous issues, and questionable U.S. commitment in the region, the 
Japanese government strengthened bilateral ties with the United States.  This was seen in 
all three of the events discussed above—the NDPO tied defense programming to U.S. 
security guarantees, the 1978 Guidelines committed Japan to greater coordination and 
functional integration through joint and combined exercises, and sea lane defense 
assigned an actual strategic role requiring equipment and tactics that could operate over 
much greater distances and in much broader scenarios than perimeter defense of the 
immediate area surrounding Japan. 
In conclusion, Japan began to take on a regional security role through its 
assumption of sea lane defense.  Significant military change in this period involved the 
assumption of the new roles and responsibilities regarding sea lane defense.  
Correspondingly, this resulted in the need for improved performance and capability from 
new ships and aircraft.  As with the first case study, external international events fail to 
fully explain the exponential steps taken in the 1970s and 1980s to strengthen the U.S.-
Japan alliance.  Moreover, with diminishing internal political resistance to the SDF there 
appears to be a correlating acceleration in the rate at which these types of changes can 
occur.  The next case study will show how this trend has continued in the post-Cold War 
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VI. CASE STUDY 3:  BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND 
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE AFTER THE COLD WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War brought important changes to the international system.  
For policymakers in Tokyo and Washington, these events necessitated a fundamental re-
evaluation of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Ballistic missile proliferation became one 
justification for strengthening the alliance.  Started in the 1980s, U.S. pressure spurred 
Tokyo to make small and incremental contributions to Washington’s efforts throughout 
the 1990s.  However, following the biggest shakeup in Japanese domestic politics in five 
decades, institutional norms and barriers preventing defense policy change underwent 
further erosion.  Subsequently, the alliance saw considerable strengthening in the latter 
half of the 1990s.  Ultimately, this political change and the decades-long trend of 
diminishing defense constraints allowed the Japanese government to quickly react to 
North Korea’s growing missile threat.  This effort assembled the political, bureaucratic, 
and legal support necessary to make a decision in a relatively short time frame not 
traditionally witnessed in Japanese political circles.  Furthermore, these BMD measures 
have fostered greater U.S.-Japan regional defense cooperation and are removing the 
barriers to Japan’s participation in collective defense. 
B. BACKGROUND 
As noted in the previous chapter, the 1980s brought mounting pressure from the 
United States for Japan to increase burden sharing.  This involved an array of issues 
including Japan’s expanding economic clout coupled with rising trade deficits, aggressive 
Soviet expansion, and President Reagan’s determination to strengthen America’s armed 
forces and strategic alliances.    Despite deteriorating bilateral relations involving trade 
and defense conflicts, Prime Minister Nakasone favored a stronger military, and his 
proactive stance toward defense promoted closer military cooperation with the United 
States. 148   Moreover, since the 1970s, the United States had become increasingly 
interested in acquiring advanced Japanese dual-use technologies for both manufacturing 
and weapons.  Political pressure in Washington was mounted to reverse the one-direction 
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flow of defense technology realized through military licensed production since the 1950s.  
These pressures eventually led to the 1983 Exchange of Technology Agreement of the 
Nakasone cabinet that exempted the United States from export prohibitions on Japanese 
military technology (but not equipment). 149  Additionally, Nakasone formally abolished 
the One Percent Ceiling of GNP in the 1987 fiscal budget.   
In this heated environment, Tokyo’s approval of the partial lifting of the 1976 
total ban on export of arms and technology allowed for U.S.-Japan technological 
cooperation on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars program and opened 
the door to pursuing BMD.  The lifting of the ban was necessary to allow a high volume 
of two-way technology sharing and transfer.  In addition, it promoted joint U.S. projects 
which could produce interoperable defense equipment for greater participation in defense 
cooperation activities.150   Participation in SDI began with a 1986 agreement signed by 
the Nakasone administration and led to a U.S. and Japanese private defense contractor 
collaboration on a joint study on the Western Pacific Missile Architecture between 1989 
and 1993.  These efforts were driven by ballistic missile proliferation, especially in East 
Asia.  Also Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had formally called for Japanese 
participation in these efforts in March 1985, and Japanese industry, while only allowed 
limited R&D participation, understood the value of potential spin-offs and spin-ons.151  
Furthermore, the 1991 Gulf War’s somewhat successful use of U.S. patriot missiles and 
North Korea’s May 1990 and May 1993 test launches of Nodong missiles elevated 
awareness of these issues.  Subsequently, Japan upgraded its Patriot surface-to-air missile 
system to the PAC-2 anti-ballistic missile system, and currently maintains twenty-four 
batteries.152   
The fading of Cold War structures and constraints in the 1990s also greatly 
impacted the domestic political scene in Tokyo.  As noted in the previous case study, 
opposition party criticisms of the LDP’s policy to maintain the SDF and reinforce U.S. 
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security relations had shifted and diminished throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  However, 
the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) had continued to promote a policy of 
“unarmed neutrality” which included the two “nos” (“no” to the SDF and “no” to the 
security treaty).  In combination with the firm actions taken by socialists in line with this 
party platform, the SDPJ had to a large extent “acted as a brake on the militarization of 
U.S.-Japan security relations under the LDP.”153   
Seemingly overnight, the Cold-War based justification for both U.S. presence in 
the region and the need for a strong SDF vanished.  The collapse of the system 
effectively negated the primary purpose of the U.S.-Japan security treaty as a bulwark 
against Soviet communism.  For Washington, this meant possible troop reductions as 
witnessed under the Clinton administration’s proposals to cut back on its commitments to 
the region.  However, in Japan instead of confrontation between conservatives and 
socialists, a coalition government was formed that fundamentally realigned domestic 
political forces.154  More importantly, as the first socialist prime minister (Murayama 
Tomiichi, 1994–96) in nearly fifty years took charge, he compromised his party’s stance 
on the two “nos” in order to lead the coalition.  Subsequently, these compromises resulted 
in declining electoral support, the party’s collapse in 1996, and its near disappearance by 
the end of the decade, thus virtually eliminating one of the primary roadblocks to political 
support for greater SDF legitimacy.   
In addition, the 1991 Gulf War was also a watershed in terms of Japanese security 
policy.  Initially, Tokyo’s decision to offer mainly a financial contribution generated 
intense international criticism, especially as Japanese minesweepers arrived on scene 
after the war had ended.  The combination of these events prompted lively debate among 
politicians, newspapers, and academics about Japan’s place in the world and the future 
role of Article 9 and bilateral relations with Washington.155  Moreover, in line with prior 
decades, political elites leveraged this opportunity to enhance U.S. ties under the auspices 
of the alliance.  In this radically new political environment, twenty pieces of legislation 
were passed throughout the 1990s to provide a legal framework to ensure Japan’s 
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security, enhance the credibility of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and promote 
cooperation within the international community.156  
While these types of legislation still followed the “restrictive consent” pattern of 
the past by granting conditional freedoms, the rate of change was significant.  From the 
mid-1990s onward, significant efforts were made to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
Concerned that the drawdown of U.S. military presence in East Asia was corroding the 
ability of bilateral networks to respond to regional contingencies, the U.S. began pushing 
in February of 1995 (known as the Nye initiative) to rehabilitate the alliance.157  These 
efforts were also used in coordination with Japan to restructure its security policy and led 
to the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security announced by President Clinton in April 
1996 which pledged Japan’s continued host nation support of U.S. troops, cooperation on 
studying BMD, and a commitment to a review of the 1978 Defense Guidelines.158   
Through the formation of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in May 1996, the 
revised guidelines were finalized by September 1997, and the legal framework for these 
changes was passed by the Diet in May 1999 through revisions of the SDF Law.  Most 
importantly, the joint declaration and revised guidelines represented a significant upgrade 
of interoperability in responding to regional contingencies and expanded the geographical 
scope by including the entire Asia-Pacific region.159 
With the Cold War ending, SDI research efforts in the United States transitioned 
to national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD)—NMD was 
designed for homeland defense against ICBMs, and TMD was intended to protect 
deployed U.S. forces from shorter range ballistic missiles in their mid to terminal phase. 
In Japan, BMD represented these TMD efforts.  Japanese interest existed at two levels.  
First, for industry it offered the next step in Japan’s own Air Defense Initiative (ADI) 
which was experiencing funding delays and uncertain political support.  Second, for the 
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JDA and the government it offered the best defense against North Korean missiles.160  
Washington again added official pressure when Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
requested Japan’s assistance for TMD during a visit to Tokyo in October 1993.  
Subsequently, Japan participated in a U.S.-Japan Theater Missile Defense Working 
Group and a 1994 Bilateral Study on Ballistic Missile Defense, and between 1995 and 
1998, the Japanese government spent 560 million yen on BMD.161   
Being far too large and complex for credible indigenous development, BMD 
required a new level of unprecedented risk of agreeing to jointly develop a program with 
the United States that had not yet been tested and deployed.162  Accordingly, it also 
required a new level of trust between U.S. and Japanese defense industry communities.  
In the wake of the negative fallout from the FSX collaboration of the 1980s and the 
LDP’s losses to a new coalition government, Japan remained noncommittal about any 
type of actual cooperative research.  North Korea’s August 1998 Taepodong missile 
launch re-invigorated Tokyo’s stance on BMD research, and by the end of year, joint 
research with the United States was approved.  Moreover, from 1999 Tokyo went to great 
lengths to stress that the Japan-U.S. BMD cooperation remained purely at the research 
stage.   
However, it was not until the end of 2002 that three key events convinced Tokyo 
to radically change course.163  First, in October 2002 Tokyo learned of Pyongyang’s 
uranium enrichment program.  This was followed in December 2002 by North Korea’s 
decision to resume activities at all nuclear facilities and this eventually led to its 
subsequent withdrawal from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003.  
Tokyo’s response was decidedly swift as well as sweeping.  Less than one month after 
the enrichment announcement, JDA Director General Ishiba Shigeru called for moving 
BMD to the development phase, and five days after the resumption announcement, Ishiba 
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indicated to U.S. officials that Japan would study development and deployment.  And in 
February 2003, one month after the NPT statement, Japan officially requested detailed 
information on U.S.-designed missile systems.  In May 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi 
indicated that Japan might “accelerate consideration” of its participation in a joint 
program.164  Subsequently, in December 2003, Japan announced it would procure a U.S. 
off-the-shelf BMD system while continuing to investigate joint development of future 
technology.  With this decision, Japan is scheduled to receive a two-tier system in the 
2007—11 timeframe consisting of an upper-tier sea-based Navy Theater Wide Defense 
(NTWD) and a lower-tier Terminal Defense Segment (TDS) using PAC-3.  This new 
shield is intended to defend against 1,000 kilometer range ballistic missiles which have a 
total flight time of less than 10 minutes.   
BMD has potentially radical implications for Japan’s strategic posture in East 
Asia.  The “spear” of the U.S. nuclear deterrent would be complemented with a BMD 
“shield,” allowing Japan deterrence by both punishment and denial.165  Beyond that it 
will lead to several important changes: 1) operational dependence on the United States—
Japan does not possess IR satellite capability to detect and track hostile missiles—thus, 
leading to closer integration of command and control and likely increased interoperability 
between U.S. and Japan TMD forces; 2) closer tactical bilateral cooperation as the ship-
based NTWD will be deployable to up to 2,000 nautical miles and may be called on to 
protect other allied forces in the region; and 3) undermining the prohibition on collective 
self-defense.166  Ultimately, BMD’s breaching of the ban on collective defense could 
open the door for changes in the scope of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation in other 
contexts.167  All of these are major changes to the nature of Japanese security policy over 
the past fifty years. 
Japan’s motivation for quicker BMD procurement has been influenced by many 
factors.  The first, of course, has been the North Korean threat and their willingness to 
use these weapons.  Second, BMD is a legitimate means to counter the missile threats 
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from North Korea, China, Russia, etc, and it fits into Japan’s self-defense policies as a 
strictly defensive capability.  Additionally, Japan already possesses many of the 
platforms including Aegis ships and PAC-2s for upgrade.  Finally, procurement cost and 
schedule have also been driving factors as system testing has progressed relatively 
smoothly and cost projections per platform have decreased.168  Nonetheless, the fourteen-
month period prior to December 2003 was a pivotal turning point in Tokyo’s approach to 
BMD.  During this period “political elites and the public joined the government in 
recognizing the danger posed by North Korea’s missile buildup.”169  This was assisted by 
rising North Korea-phobia within Japan due to the combined effects of North Korea’s 
history of missile tests, abductions, nuclear proliferation, and spy ship incursions.  Prior 
to this point, U.S. pressure had been relatively ineffective in persuading Tokyo to fully 
commit to BMD research and development.  But during 2003, the Japanese government 
decided to essentially bypass the economic and technical benefits of joint research and 
development and go straight to off-the-shelf procurement.  This is a marked contrast to 
all previous Japanese defense programs. 
The domestic political reaction during this short period was even further evidence 
of the change in attitude brought by these events as political and legal barriers quickly 
faded.  First, the LDP and the main opposition party—the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ)—joined together to support BMD after 2002.170  Realizing the substantial public 
concern over the North Korean aggression, the DPJ conceded on this issue, realizing that 
if it wanted to be considered capable of ruling the country it could not afford a weak 
stance on this important issue.   
More importantly, a second and even bigger telling event emerged as the Koizumi 
administration achieved a broader reinterpretation of self-defense that amazingly 
attracted little Diet or public reaction.  This came in the form of two separate rulings in 
2003 and 2004.  The first expanded the definition of collective self-defense and ruled that 
intercepting a missile “judged to have a significant probability of targeting Japan…will 
be considered to have justified our right to self-defense,”  and the second included the 
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exchange of theater-area information by stating:  “it’s necessary to share intelligence 
between our two countries to guarantee Japan’s security.  Doing so does not constitute an 
attempt to gather intelligence for the purposes of supporting U.S. military actions.”171  
Consequently, through these interpretations Japan overcame the primary legal barriers to 
deploying BMD and could potentially integrate data from its BMD sensors into a global 
missile defense architecture, assist in detecting and eliminating missiles in the region, and 
still remain legally outside participation in collective defense.    
While Japanese officials have continually stressed that BMD acquisition is 
intended solely for an independent capability and not for the defense of others, the U.S. 
request in June 2004 to move the ASDF’s Air Defense Command to the U.S. Air Force 
base at Yokota may be seen as an attempt to promote the integration of BMC4I systems 
for BMD. 172   Furthermore, U.S. and Japanese officials decided to intensify their 
consultations on the realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and signed an agreement 
in October of 2005 that re-affirmed bilateral relations as the indispensable foundation of 
Japan’s security.   
C. ASSESSMENT 
The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the international system.  However, 
Tokyo’s opportunity to find a different road (in place of U.S. bilateral ties) faded as other 
external threats gained greater saliency, and Japanese policymakers’ choice of action, 
once again, defaulted to increasing U.S. alignment.  Political turmoil under a coalition 
government not only failed to stop this trend, but also contributed to its continuation by 
almost single-handedly removing Socialist Party’s influence in restraining security 
policy. 
Japan’s pursuit of BMD began the post-Cold War period with relatively little 
support.  Even repeated U.S. pressure resulted in little more than small defense outlays 
and some collaborative research.  However, this all changed once North Korea presented 
a clear indication that it potentially possessed both the will and capability to deliver a 
nuclear weapon on Japanese soil.  Did Pyongyang really represent a dramatic increase in 
danger in comparison to external threats from the five previous decades?  While this is 
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debatable (both the Chinese and Soviets represented much stronger threats for extended 
periods), there clearly was something unique about this period—political elites had more 
freedom to act within the domestic political system.  In quick succession, policymakers 
rallied public support and solicited the political, legal, and bureaucratic consent to 
actually field a BMD capability.  Moreover, these efforts also significantly expanded the 
need for increasing cooperation within the U.S.-Japan alliance allowing Japan to enlarge 
its regional and global influence in security matters, also representing substantial change 
to prior policy.     
Therefore, in this case study, military change has still remained geared toward 
enhanced U.S. defense cooperation and is a continuation of the efforts initiated in the 
1980s.  The three trends seen throughout the case studies are still evident.  First, U.S. 
pressure still exhibits itself in many different forms.  However, Tokyo appears to have 
more leeway in deciding which issues to engage, as it eventually did with BMD.  Faced 
again with potential U.S. troop withdrawals, Tokyo gladly revised the defense guidelines.  
Additionally, the external fears of North Korea forced Tokyo’s hand with BMD.  Second, 
the role of domestic politics, while still an important shaper of security policy, actually 
promoted rather than inhibited the government’s response to an external threat.  And 
lastly, despite major shifts in the region, the bilateral ties with the United States have 
been reaffirmed repeatedly in the late 1990s and on into this century.  In connection with 
peacekeeping operations which began in the 1990s, BMD represents Japan’s commitment 



























Military change has been an ongoing part of Japan’s re-emergence from the 
devastation of World War II.  After abdicating all its sovereignty and agreeing to total 
disarmament, Japan has re-established itself over the past fifty-five years as a potent 
military power that is increasingly willing to take on greater regional and global 
responsibilities.  As Chapter III emphasizes, the Japanese defense structure is not perfect 
and has been formed under the political, institutional, legal, and societal norms and 
limitations infused in the postwar environment.  Nonetheless, political elites have 
demonstrated a commitment to building a strong military capability despite these and 
other outside influences.   
In looking at the rate of change of defense policy, Japan’s ability to initiate 
military change has steadily increased.  From 1954 to the early 1970s, it required nearly 
two decades to build the foundation for its forces and then equip them with the necessary 
land, air, and sea forces available from a modern industrial base.  Subsequently, in the 
next decade (1976 to the mid-1980s) policies were put in place that allowed not only 
unparalleled defense cooperation with the United States but also greater strategic 
responsibilities requiring new and longer range military hardware.  Finally, while BMD 
started out like many other defense initiatives that languished under slow, incremental 
commitment, under considerable external pressure from North Korea it transitioned from 
what Kliman labels a “norms-based” to an “interest-based” defense policy.173  In the past, 
where policies had taken years if not decades to gain political consensus, the national 
security apparatus of the twenty-first century radically reshaped the direction of BMD 
literally in only months.  The domestic political roots of this greater ability to react to 
external events are clearly indicated in the presented case studies.   
The three trends discussed throughout this thesis offer important insights into this 
process.  First, during this period, while regional and world conditions have undergone 
dramatics shifts and changes, the Japanese government has continued to rely upon the 
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U.S.-Japan alliance to build its military.  Furthermore, the one overwhelming constant 
has been Tokyo’s continual commitment to strengthening this relationship.  This has 
occurred in every decade despite rising and falling external threats, growing and then 
stagnant Japanese economic clout, waxing and waning U.S. influence, and increasing 
trade friction just to a name a few.   
While external conditions are routinely used to explain this strengthening, other 
factors must be considered to fully explain this consistency.  For example, Japan’s 
choices in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s suggest that systemic pressure from the 
international system may not have been the primary influence for strengthening bilateral 
ties.  In the 1970s, Tokyo had already agreed to the policy changes of the 1976 NDPO 
indicating that détente dictated a less dangerous military stance, yet they still pursued 
greater defense cooperation leading to the 1978 Defense Guidelines.  The growing Soviet 
threat occurred only at the end of this process and cannot readily be linked to influencing 
Tokyo’s earlier decisions.  The mid-1980s then witnessed waning Soviet influence and 
rising U.S. strength.  Nonetheless, Prime Minister Nakasone continued full-speed with 
his military modernization efforts which were not even addressed until well after the 
Cold War ended.   
Second, U.S. pressure has been an ever-present factor throughout the entire period.  
However, its effects appear to have somewhat diminished over time.  This should not be 
surprising since a Japan, which was still recovering from defeat, had little room for 
negotiating in the 1950s.  Consequently, with rising regional and world influence by the 
1970s, Japan could not be expected to fully cater to U.S. demands.  Nonetheless, Tokyo 
has demonstrated a skillful ability to rely on domestic political considerations to pick and 
choose its response to U.S. pressure.  This was true in the 1950s under the Yoshida 
doctrine, in the 1980s as the U.S. sought greater defense cooperation, and after the Cold 
War during BMD research and development.  To borrow from Kliman again, major U.S. 
successes have come when Washington has been “pushing on an open door” as Japanese 
interests lined up with U.S. demands.174  LDP dominance throughout the entire postwar 
period (1994—96 notwithstanding) has translated to a commitment to field a modern 
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military.  However, as the case studies have shown, domestic politics has played a large 
role in determining policy direction as well as their rate of change.   
Consequently, the third trend has been the necessity for political elites to 
subordinate national security interests (e.g., rearmament) to the influence and norms of 
Japan’s evolving domestic political environment.  This has led to the “restrictive consent” 
policies seen throughout each case study where new freedoms come loaded with 
conditions and limitations.  This policymaking approach is still alive today.  However, 
the prohibitions and strength of many of the early defense constraints witnessed in the 
first three decades have greatly diminished as the barriers within the political system have 
collapsed.  One obvious example of this has been SDF legitimacy.  Being established 
under quasi-legitimate and suspicious political circumstances in the 1950s, it gained only 
marginal political acceptance by the end of the 1970s.  But throughout the 1980s and 
especially in the 1990s as the socialist platform disappeared, the SDF has finally gained a 
semblance of political credibility.   The erosion of these political barriers has ultimately 
allowed greater freedom and speed in adapting defense policies to existing external 
conditions and LDP political priorities.    
Another example has included the declining public and political fallout when 
government officials pursue more nationalistic agendas.  For Prime Minister Kishi in the 
1950s, his attempts at strengthening U.S. relations and Article 9 revision ended in 
resignation and nationwide protests.  However, in the 1980s under Prime Minster 
Nakasone, his calls for greater military capability and cooperation with the United States 
witnessed only marginal public and political support forcing him to compromise on many 
of the political platforms he had supported as JDA director in the 1970s.  And finally, 
Prime Minister Koizumi has by far obtained the most support for his defense initiatives 
with BMD being just one of a number of successful policies he been able to pursue in this 
new century.  Overtime they have had fewer constraints to pursue their preferred policies. 
B. THEORY REVISITED 
Reflecting back on the innovation theory from Chapter II, what would the experts 
have predicted as potential key drivers of important Japanese military change?  Rosen 
would have anticipated the source of change to have originated from within the JSDF 
itself.  In this peacetime environment, high ranking officials should have had the 
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resources to receive inputs from the civilian and scientific sectors and steer long-term 
procurement programs to deliver needed capabilities.  Additionally, these officials would 
have benefited by identifying talented younger officers willing to pursue needed changes, 
and through adjusting the promotion system to recognize these types of skills, the 
changes could have been strengthened.  Based on the case studies presented in this thesis, 
however, it is apparent that SDF officials, especially military officers, had very limited 
opportunity to affect changes in defense policy.  Only in the last decade have these 
officials gained greater influence and respect within public and political circles. 
Posen, on the other hand, would have looked beyond the military and 
concentrated on the civilian sector.  The reason is two fold.  First, military personnel are 
too absorbed in their own parochial service-based interests to truly appreciate or assess 
the need for new changes.  Second, civilians would naturally be more in tune with the 
overall strategic environment and be better able to make appropriate adjustments in 
military doctrine to adapt to changing international conditions and new technologies.  In 
the case of Japan, Posen is nearly half right.  Indeed, it is the civilians who dominate 
postwar defense policy, however, it is their own self-interest mixed with ideological 
baggage and political agendas that prevents them from being able to stand above the 
crowd and see and adapt to the larger security environment. 
Kier’s cultural analysis comes closest to Japan’s experience.  In her framework, 
the expediency of assessing the international system to ensure state survival often gets 
absorbed by other factors.  She would have predicted that domestic politics would indeed 
have played a primary role in determining strategic decisions.  Accordingly, the SDF 
would have needed to incorporate these politically motivated policies into the limits of 
existing military organizations and equipment.  In essence, military leaders must play the 
hand they are dealt and adapt within this framework.  However, two things complicate 
this picture.  First, the effect of an overarching U.S. security umbrella may have allowed 
Japan the ability to more fully subordinate these strategic considerations thus giving 
domestic factors larger influence than may have otherwise been normally possible.  
Second, as the BMD case study shows, Japan’s postwar norms have eroded and in doing 
so Tokyo has gained a greater ability to react in the rationalist tradition.  
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As noted in Chapter II, Rosen conceded that no good explanation of bureaucratic 
innovation exists.  Additionally, these three examples highlight the limitations and 
narrow applications of existing theories especially when looking specifically at the 
military field of research.  Japan’s experience with military change is quite different in 
comparison to the traditional cases used in most studies.  Nonetheless, significant value 
comes by using this knowledge to provide a range of options to better deal with current 
and future events involving Japan’s interaction in regional and global affairs. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Based on more than a half-century of postwar experience involving two defining 
periods during the rise and fall of the Cold War era, the future will most likely entail 
continual incremental change in Japan’s security policy albeit at a quicker pace.  Outside 
the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, one of Japan’s greatest contributions has been its 
development and nurturing of the comprehensive notions of security that have provided 
Japan with its “current relevant, distinct, and effective role in East Asian security.”175  
Future policy will be heavily influenced by six major trends prevalent in today’s 
environment.   
First U.S.-Japan bilateralism will remain the main pillar of Japan’s security 
policies and will help moderate efforts to normalize military security aspects.  These ties 
were most recently reaffirmed in October 2005 with the conclusion of the Security 
Consultative Committee agreements on basing arrangements in Okinawa and the 2+2 
talks where Tokyo reiterated its support for enhancing U.S.-Japan command and control 
efforts as well as BMD.  Second, normalization will occur via the continued weakening 
of defense constraints that have been erected over decades of domestic debate involving 
the legitimacy of the SDF and lingering public pacifism.  As demonstrated in this thesis, 
the rate of this change will be highly sensitive to external international conditions as 
China and the Korean Peninsula more fully integrate into the international system.   
Third, this normalization process will also benefit from the ongoing pluralization/ 
fluidity of domestic politics which by its democratic nature forces transparency and 
public debate, allowing both domestic and international actors awareness and/or 
involvement in the process.  Fourth, the reactive nature of foreign policy will continue to                                                  
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show less passivity as the flexibility timidly exercised during the Cold War adapts and 
continues to experiment with the new-found freedoms of an increasingly globalized, 
interdependent, and multipolar world.  Fifth, with the uncertainties provided by a less 
rigid international system in the post-Cold War period, Japan’s sense of vulnerability has 
once again been more fully exposed.  The success of more than two decades of reforms in 
China and the continued belligerence of a nuclear weapon seeking North Korea present a 
full spectrum of challenges that will require constant vigilance and skillful diplomacy for 
all actors in the region.   
And finally, Japan’s economic condition, which has been the major driving force 
behind its role in the region, will require considerable attention to navigate the coming 
decades.  The fiscal realities of a decade of stagnation have put pressure on foreign policy 
resources including ODA, U.N. dues, and host nation support of U.S. forces in Japan.  
With an aging population, weak domestic demand, and the corrosive effects of the recent 
deflationary environment, Japan’s dependency on Asia will only deepen for both the 
abundance of resources as well as its huge market of potential consumers.   
Bilateral and multilateral relations in the region will be essential for success.   
Asia’s diverse and dynamic environment has only become more complex in the post-
Cold War period.  Representing roughly half the world’s population and a fifth of global 
trade, worldwide peace and security will depend on responsible multilateral dialogue in 
the region.  Japan’s best interests are served by continuing to improve relations in these 
types of institutions especially ones where the United States has not been allowed to exert 
its direct influence.   
Regarding U.S. foreign policy towards Japan’s future military capabilities, the 
United States has two primary avenues it can pursue depending on the nature of the issue.  
Obviously, these have remained the same over the entire post-World War II period in that 
Washington can either encourage or discourage increasing military strength based on 
Tokyo’s chosen security policies.  Based on the conclusions of this thesis, three themes 
must be considered when implementing either of these two options: 
— First, U.S. pressure while an important and necessary part of the equation has, 
by itself, only been marginally effective.  U.S. policymakers must remain well-informed 
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of relevant Japanese domestic factors, understand their impact, and be able to capitalize 
on appropriate issues when they arise.   
— Second, prior domestic restraints which have produced an endless list of 
defense constraints and have readily labeled the Japanese policymaking process as 
“immobile,” “incremental,” and “evolutionary” are changing.  Japan’s reaction to the 
international environment in the last few years provides detailed evidence of this trend.  
U.S. policymakers must understand this fundamental shift and be able to use it 
accordingly to produce the desired effects.   
— Third, since 1955 Japan has shown its resounding commitment to the U.S.-
Japan alliance and has readily contributed to its strengthening.  Nonetheless, while this 
commitment should continue for the foreseeable future, it cannot be taken for granted 
especially keeping mind the changes in theme two, above.   Ultimately, Washington 
needs to continue to offer the government of Japan greater consultation, authority, and 
leadership responsibilities in regional and world matters. 
Japan’s security policy has changed dramatically—and increasingly rapidly—
over the past fifty years, for reasons that primarily came from domestic politics.  
Understanding the future prospects for such change is vital for understanding the likely 
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